Farewell to Scott Adams, the beloved creator of "Dilbert"

We recently lost esteemed and beloved creative genius Scott Adams.  His “Dilbert“ comic strip skewered corporate America and it’s hypocrisy, personalities, buzzwords, and, most of all, the corporate mania for not paying for the scope of the work actually done by cubicle dwellers -- and, conversely, found humor in the the slice of employees who are allergic to actually producing anything. 

 

Who can forget the co-worker “Bottleneck," the clueless pointy–haired boss, and, of course the evil HR Director "Catbert." 

 

His keen observations will be sorely missed. 

 

 

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Follow up to post "Order Granting New Trial Upheld Where Plaintiff’s Counsel Improperly Violates Pre-Trial Orders by Arguing “Reptile Theory," etc."

 

 

This post is a follow-up to our prior post about attorney misconduct in violating a motion in limine preventing improper “reptile theory” and “golden roll“ arguments. (See blogger.com/blog/post/edit/5476224163973754209/4369127834107886388.)we 

 

Unfortunately, it is a frequent occurrence that trial counsel blatantly ignore pretrial rulings as to evidence and, indeed, court rulings in other contexts as well.  In circumstances of such attorney misconduct, it is important to realize there are various provisions that provide for consequences, including, but not limited to, both court-room specific rules and local rules as well as California's state-wide rules.  

 

One such provision is California Rules of Court, Rule 2.30, entitled "Sanctions for rules violations in civil cases."  This rule provides for monetary sanctions and states in full:

 

 

(a) Application

This sanctions rule applies to the rules in the California Rules of Court relating to general civil cases, unlawful detainer cases, probate proceedings, civil proceedings in the appellate division of the superior court, and small claims cases.

(Subd (a) amended effective January 1, 2004; adopted effective July 1, 2001.)

(b) Sanctions

In addition to any other sanctions permitted by law, the court may order a person, after written notice and an opportunity to be heard, to pay reasonable monetary sanctions to the court or an aggrieved person, or both, for failure without good cause to comply with the applicable rules. For the purposes of this rule, "person" means a party, a party's attorney, a witness, and an insurer or any other individual or entity whose consent is necessary for the disposition of the case. If a failure to comply with an applicable rule is the responsibility of counsel and not of the party, any penalty must be imposed on counsel and must not adversely affect the party's cause of action or defense thereto.

(Subd (b) amended effective January 1, 2007; adopted as untitled subdivision effective January 1, 1985; amended and relettered effective July 1, 2001; previously amended effective January 1, 1994, and January 1, 2004.)

(c) Notice and procedure

Sanctions must not be imposed under this rule except on noticed motion by the party seeking sanctions or on the court's own motion after the court has provided notice and an opportunity to be heard. A party's motion for sanctions must (1) state the applicable rule that has been violated, (2) describe the specific conduct that is alleged to have violated the rule, and (3) identify the attorney, law firm, party, witness, or other person against whom sanctions are sought. The court on its own motion may issue an order to show cause that must (1) state the applicable rule that has been violated, (2) describe the specific conduct that appears to have violated the rule, and (3) direct the attorney, law firm, party, witness, or other person to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed against them for violation of the rule.

(Subd (c) amended effective January 1, 2007; adopted effective July 1, 2001; previously amended effective January 1, 2004.)

(d) Award of expenses

In addition to the sanctions awardable under (b), the court may order the person who has violated an applicable rule to pay to the party aggrieved by the violation that party's reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees and costs, incurred in connection with the motion for sanctions or the order to show cause.

(Subd (d) amended effective January 1, 2007; adopted effective July 1, 2001; previously amended effective January 1, 2004.)

(e) Order

An order imposing sanctions must be in writing and must recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.

 

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New Case Law: Order Granting New Trial Upheld Where Plaintiff’s Counsel Improperly Violates Pre-Trial Orders by Arguing “Reptile Theory," etc.

 

In an opinion written by Justice Codrington, the Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the grant of a motion for new trial by San Bernardino County Superior Court Judge Michael A. Sachs. (Allen v. Patel (December 23, 2025) E082051.)  The appellate opinion explained the issue involved whether the trial court properly granted a motion for new trial based upon the alleged misconduct of plaintiff and appellant’s counsel Michael K. Blue:

While plaintiff and appellant Brenda Lee Allen and her family were moving out of Ontario Airport Inn Hotel after an extended stay, she and the hotel owner, defendant and respondent Anil Bhula Patel, and the hotel manager, Luis Mejia, engaged in an altercation. Allen alleges that during the incident, Patel attacked and injured her. Allen brought a personal injury lawsuit against Patel and his company, DH Hotel Investments, Inc. (DH) (collectively referred to as defendant).  A jury awarded Allen over one million dollars in compensatory damages, and the court declared a mistrial at the bifurcated trial on her punitive damages claim, and thereafter granted defendant’s motion for a new trial (MNT). Allen appeals. Allen contends the trial court abused its discretion by granting the MNT based on attorney misconduct. . . .  We affirm the trial court’s order granting a new trial of phase one of the trial as to liability and compensatory damages. . . .  The appellate court also found the trial court had properly granted a new trial based upon misconduct by Mr. Blue in making an argument to the jury which improperly speculated as to discussions between defendant and defense counsel, speculating that defense counsel told his client he would essentially get away with his bad conduct. (Id., p. 2.

The alleged misconduct involved claims of injury not previously disclosed:

During attorney Michael K. Blue’s opening statement on behalf of Allen, he told the jury that it would hear from Allen’s doctors and that there would be testimony that, after her altercation with Patel at the Hotel, she suffered from incontinence and PTSD, which she will suffer from for the rest of her life. Blue described in detail Allen’s incontinence. Blue requested the jury to award Allen $6,000,000 in compensatory damages. After Blue completed his opening statement, defendant moved for a mistrial on the grounds that Blue raised new and argumentative issues that were never disclosed before. Defendant argued that Blue improperly stated during his opening statement that Allen was immunocompromised and suffered from a bone disease. Defendant asserted that this was improper because Allen’s attorneys would not be providing any medical testimony by any designated medical physician, establishing these diagnoses or prognoses. The trial court responded that Allen’s treating physician could testify regarding his own diagnoses but could not testify regarding other diagnoses or causation unless designated as an expert witness. Will we tolerate that? That decision is going to be your decision in just a few moments. (Id., pp. 6-7.)

Patel moved for a new trial under Code of Civil Procedure section 657,2 based on 1) irregularity in proceedings which prevented a fair trial, 2) accident or surprise, 3) excessive damages, and/or 4) insufficiency of evidence or the verdict is against the law.  The Lee opinion summarized the trial court’s grant of a motion for new trial as follows:

After hearing oral argument on July 19, 2023, on Patel’s MNT, the trial court ordered a new trial. During the hearing, the trial court stated in detail its reasons. The court found that Allen’s evidence was tainted by Blue’s misconduct. The court explained that it had granted several motions in limine (MIL) orders, which Blue violated. The trial court expressed concerns about Allen introducing evidence of bowel and G.I. issues, which Allen claimed were caused by the Hotel incident. The trial court asked Blue if there would be evidence offered by an expert showing causation linking Allen’s GI claims with the Hotel incident, and Blue told the court, yes, which was false. (Id., p. 8.)

The trial court also found that plaintiff’s counsel had violated an in limine order made at the outset of trial which prohibited both “golden rule” and “reptile theory” arguments. The trial court also found, inter alia, that during the first phase of the bifurcated trial, plaintiff’s counsel had improperly asked the jury to award punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that plaintiff had not met her burden of showing any error by the trial court in granting a motion for new trial:

We conclude there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s findings that Blue made knowingly false and misleading statements and elicited inadmissible, prejudicial, and highly inflammatory testimony in violation of the court’s orders and warnings not to introduce evidence of Allen’s incontinence unless Blue was able to introduce expert witness testimony establishing a medical diagnosis of her condition and that it was caused by the Hotel incident. (Id., p. 25.)

As to golden rule arguments, the Fourth District found Mr. Blue had violated the trial court’s in limine order “by suggesting that when considering the amount of fair value compensation Allen should receive for her losses, the jurors should imagine what it would be like to be forced to accept the loss of ’every single thing that matters' to them" in exchange for a monetary award. (Id., p. 29.)

As to so-called “reptile theory,” the appellate court concluded that “violation of the [prohibiton against] reptile theory occurs when counsel asks jurors to base their decisions on concerns about their own safety and the safety of the community rather than the applicable standard of care,” citing to Regalado v. Callaghan (2016) 3 Cal. App. 5th 582, at 599.).  Mr. Blue patently violated the order precluding such by virtue of the following argument to the jury, as summarized by the Allen court:

Blue began his opening statement by stating, “I’m scared. I couldn’t sleep last night because I’m scared. It’s an enormous obligation to represent somebody who cannot represent themselves. . . . I’m shaking. My knees are shaking. . . . It’s a privilege of a lifetime. . . when you believe in somebody. My fear is that I have not done a good enough job to represent that person the way that person deserved to be represented that I have failed. And at some point I’m going to hand this case . . . to you for you to take this case for me. And that scares me to death.”
Blue then told the jury it had “an opportunity to make a difference. We go through life, try to set an example, try and do the right thing. Maybe somebody will see. Maybe our children will see. Maybe our students will see. But seldom do we have an opportunity to defend our community, to champion our community, to stand as the last bastion for what we will tolerate for our community. Will we tolerate men coming into a room with a vulnerable woman, the most vulnerable of us and put their hands on her? Will we tolerate that? That decision is going to be your decision in just a few moments. (Id., p. 30.)

The appellate court also found the trial court had properly granted a new trial based upon misconduct by Mr. Blue in making an argument to the jury which improperly speculated as to discussions between defendant and defense counsel, Mr. Blue telling the jury that defense counsel may have told defendant they would essentially get away with his bad conduct. (Id., p. 33.)

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Welcome to 2026 - The Year of America 250

 

 Happy New Year 2026

 

 

As we welcome 2026, Best Wishes for the New Year.  This should be an exciting, even disruptive year:  American military and technological leadership is back, and our "America 250 Celebration" begins now.  
 
As for legal predictions, I note that conventional wisdom is that the United States Supreme Court will limit the President's use of tariffs under an "emergency” rationale, but it may not matter because the President has other powers in this regard.  
 
This sounds somewhat likely, but the real answer, of course, is that no one really knows what will happen.  One thing I have learned is that those who appear to know the outcome of litigation beforehand really don't, and that virtually all participants in the legal system underestimate the risks of an adverse outcome.  But looking at this philosophically, if litigants were to accurately gauge the risks of litigation, there would be far less of it and far less work for legal professionals.

 

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Fear not: for, behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which shall be to all people

 

Our family wishes you a very merry, peaceful, and spiritually meaningful Christmas and best wishes for 2026.

As The Gospel According to Luke, Chapter Two, tells us:

And, lo, the angel of the Lord came upon them, and the glory of the Lord shone round about them: and they were sore afraid.
And the angel said unto them, 

Fear not: for, behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which shall be to all people.

 
We will return to posting after the 12 days of Christmas.

 

 
 

California Supreme Court Update for 2026

 

 

 California Supreme Court 2026

 

With the next year approaching, we should take a look at upcoming issues before the California Supreme Court in 2026.  Upcoming civil cases are summarized at the Supreme Court's website at:

 

https://supreme.courts.ca.gov/sites/default/files/supremecourt/default/2025-12/pendingissues-civil%20-%20121225_0.pdf 

 

What is interesting is the lack of blockbuster cases, at least as opposed to past years.  Of course, there are some issues of consequence, such as an insurance coverage case about insurer liability for water damage when water enters the building following wind damage and occurs during a roof repair. (11640 Woodbridge Condominium Homeowners’ Assn. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange
S290750.)

 

However, the scope of issues before the California Supreme Court pale in comparison to Federal Court cases involving California.  Chief among these is the Department of Justice' challenge to California's Congressional redistricting plan on Constitutional grounds:

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1417291/dl?inline=&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery

 

But in California there appear to be no cases of such historic proportion.  Perhaps this is because California is a one-party state.  The Democrat party has the lion's share of influence, it not outright supremacy, in all three branches of government, making it unlikely the state's highest court will be called upon to decide crucial issues.

 

 

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Update - While the First Amendment May Protect Statements Urging Soldiers to Disobey Orders, this Protection May Not Apply to Such Statements Made by Persons in Uniform

 

 

Update to our prior post about the constitutional and statutory definition of "treason"

 

In our prior post we discussed shocking statements by elected members of a particular political party that members of the United States military should  disobey the orders of the President of the United States.  Our conclusion was that the definition of "treason" may be implicated by such statements, but the Constitutional and statutory definition of treason is constrained by the free speech protections of the First Amendment.

 

This article did not take into account the fact that two of the individuals making these statements are potentially subject military law, which does not permit those in uniform the same level of free speech protection as is afforded others.  Let us take the example of two senators. Senator Duckworth is one of the authors of these remarkable statements, is currently a member of the Army reserve and the National Guard.  Senator Kelley is retired military and continues to display his uniform. We thank them for their service made prior to their recent statements.

 

The simple fact is that statements urging our military to ignore the chain of command made by these persons potentially violates military law, notwithstanding the First Amendment.

 

 

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Potential Appellate Issue: The Validity of Judicial or Other Appointments Made by President Biden's "Autopen"

 

 

Does Biden's use of an "autopen" to make judicial appointments comport with Federal statute?

 

The President, with approval from the Senate, has the authority under Article III of the United States Constitution to appoint Judicial Officers "for life."  How this appointment is actually made official by a "seal" upon a "commission" is set forth in Title 5 United States Code section 2902, which reads in part:

 

(a) Except as provided by subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the Secretary of State shall make out and record, and affix the seal of the United States to, the commission of an officer appointed by the President. The seal of the United States may not be affixed to the commission before the commission has been signed by the President. (Emphasis added.)

 

Note that the subsequent subsections make no mention of an autopen or, for that matter, any digital signature.  For example, section 2902(b) provides the seal may be affixed "before" the commision is signed by the President, once again requiring the President sign the commission. The question therefore becomes whether use of an autopen meets the required act, i.e., that the commission related to the appointment be "signed by the President."

Of course, the initial question is whether Biden's inner circle used an autopen for judicial appointments as those around him did in so many other contexts.  However, if even one judicial appointment used an autopen, this becomes a potential appellate issue that may ultimately need to be decided by the United States Supreme Court. 

 

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The Actual Constitutional and Statutory Definition of "Treason"

 

Recently, some members of our favorite political party have made the shocking statement that members of the United States military should potentially disobey the orders of the President of the United States.  The media discussion of these comments have generally avoided actually giving the full definition of treason, not surprising given the media’s customary tactic of avoiding specificity in their reporting.  

So let us review the United States Constitution, which provides a basic definition of treason in the Article providing for our Judiciary:

Article III Section 3

Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.

The United States Congress has further defined treason by statute:

United States Code section 2381. Treason

Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.

This, of course, begs the question of what constitutes “giving. . . aid and comfort” to our “enemies.”  Jane Fonda’s actions in traveling to Hanoi to do the bidding of our military’s enemy, the communist dictatorship in North Vietnam, and attempting to harm the morale of our troops arguably met this definition.  However, she was never prosecuted, and this follows the recent trend of defining the terms “aid and comfort” and “enemies” very narrowly, which may be said to be fitting in a democracy that prizes dissent.  This means, then, that members of Congress are free to defile themselves by attempting to interfere with the chain of command in our military.

 

 

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The final settlement of the litigation against O.J. Simpson reveals the stage of litigation that is often the most time-consuming: collecting judgments

 

 

A friend asked me recently why appeals "take so long," and I explained that usually the process is not as lengthy as one might seem. In California, if a "notice of entry of judgment" is given, the other party has only 60 days in which to file a timely notice of appeal.  Once that is done the appeal may be resolved in roughly a year and a half or so, although certain factors may influence this time-line.  For example, a court reporter may be tardy in delivering a transcript, or there may so many parties and cross-appeals the court may set a briefing schedule to accommodate the many briefs filed the parties.  And another party may play games by requesting additional time to file their brief.

 

When people say that appeals are lengthy they often refer to a different phenomenon, namely,  serial or multi-stage appeals.  A state court appeal may raise a federal issue and therefore there may be a secondary appeal to a Federal court.  More likely, a party who successfully wins an appeal on the grounds there was reversible error at trial may face another appeal by the other party when the original appellant wins after a re-trial.

 

But in most instances the appellate stage is not all that more time-consuming than the trial court stage, and often these first two stages of litigation are dwarfed by the glacial pace of attempts to collect upon a judgment.  A party may evade service of a subpoena for a judgment-debtor examination, and even when served may still not appear, and courts may require several attempts before they issue a warrant for the arrest of the debtor who refuses to attend and testify.  Worse, even after that order the warrant may not have any effect until, for example, the debtor is stopped for a routine traffic infraction and faces jail time.

 

Which brings us to the saga of Goldman v. Simpson.  After a jury of 12 acquitted Mr. Simpson of a double murder despite overwhelming evidence (for the makeup of the jury, see https://famous-trials.com/simpson/1852-civiljury), Simpson was sued for wrongful death by Fred Goldman, the father of Ron Goldman. Mr. Goldman and his wife alleged their son was violently killed by Mr. Simpson, who also killed his ex-wife Nicole Brown Simpson.  In 1997, a jury awarded Mr. and Mrs. Goldman $33,000,000, but the collection process has taken decades as Mr. Simpson golfed year after year and said he did not have funds to pay the settlement.  

 

On November 14, 2025, the estate of Mr. Simpson finally accepted the claim of the Goldmans, as reported by the Los Angeles Times (https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2025-11-18/after-three-decades-o-j-simpsons-estate-agrees-to-pay-nearly-58-million-to-goldman-family).   

 

To the degree the assets of the estate exceed its debts, justice may finally be done nearly 30 years too late.

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Separation of Powers: The jurist who permitted the shocking abuses of “Arctic frost” is none other than anti-Trump Judge Boasberg, who now faces attempts at his impeachment

 

 

As you no doubt have heard, the Joe Biden / Kamala Harris administration, led by Attorney General Merrick Garland and special prosecutor Jack Smith, abused their power and ignored the separation of powers found in the United States Constitution by instituting the “Arctic frost“ probe.  The gist of this probe is that they posited a criminal, President Trump, and then decided to cast as wide a net as possible to find a crime to match their target.  Special prosecutor Smith’s apparent thinking was that there had to be a crime involved in claims of President Trump and other Republicans that there was fraud and other irregularities in the 2016 election (the only election ever conducted in a largely “remote” fashion), and he therefore issued subpoenas of truly shocking scope.

Included in these were subpoenas for records relating to Turning Point USA and other private organizations, and even worse, phone records of many Republican members of Congress including nine Senators, and, indeed, key senators such as Ted Cruz and Lindsey Graham.   Even worse, the subpoenas included an order that the subject not be told that the records were being sought, on the pretense that the targets of the subpoenas might destroy records.  Obviously, the Senators involved take great umbrage at the suggestion they should not be told about the subpoena because they would, as United States Senators, actively seek to destroy records.  This part of Judge Boasberg's order is seen below:

 

 

One might ask how any Jurist on the planet would approve such a subpoena

The answer, it turns out, is that the reason the subpoena was approved is that the jurist who did so is United States District Court Judge James Boasberg for the District of Columbia.  Recall that this jurist directed the location and route of United States government planes — as part of his supposed “equitable powers” which he believes extend to oversight as to how a co-equal branch of government operates. (See https://appellatespectator.blogspot.com/2025/03/the-judiciarys-takeover-of-executive.html.)  He also has been accused of making derogatory comments about President Trump at a judicial conference even though Mr. Trump is a litigant before his Court, making it apparent he cannot view any action involving this litigant in an objective fashion, but Judge Boasberg has not recused himself, something not permitted by the Rules of Ethics.  Indeed, historian Victor Davis Hanson has called Judge Boastberg “the most powerful man in America” even though he is a trial judge. (See https://www.foxnews.com/video/6370751312112 .)

And now we have these subpoenas intended as nothing short of a “take down” of persons with opposing political views by conducting a wide-ranging fishing expedition involving several entities and persons and seeking phone private phone records.  

And now we have these subpoenas intended as nothing short of a “take down” of persons with opposing political views by conducting a wide-ranging fishing expedition involving several entities and persons seeking iphone private phone records.  The offensive and extraordinarily broad attempt by the Executive Branch (prosecutor Smith) and the Judicial Branch (Judge Boasberg) to invade the privacy of both private citizens and the realm of the Legislative Branch is illustrated by the text of one such extra-Constitutional subpoena:  

 

 

 

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Case law Update -- Service of Statement of Damages Upon Pro Se Litigant Properly Made at PO Box Listed in Substitution of Attorney Form

 

 

In an opinion written by Justice Lui, the Court of Appeal of the Second District, Division Two, of California, has upheld a default judgment against a party in propria person. (Backlund v. Stone (October 27, 2025).) (https://courts.ca.gov/opinion/published/2025-10-27/b340369 .). The court summarized the extensive factual and procedural background  of the case very succinctly:

 

In 2010, Alyssa Backlund (Backlund) sued Christopher Stone (Stone) for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and related claims. Her complaint did not specify any amounts of damages. Stone hired counsel and defended the lawsuit for some time before his counsel filed a substitution of attorney form, showing that Stone was now self-represented, and listing a P.O. box as Stone’s address. Stone then failed to appear or to defend the action, leading to his answer being stricken. Backlund mailed a statement of damages to the address Stone provided on the substitution of attorney form and then got a default judgment against him for more than $1 million. Backlund renewed the judgment almost a decade later. Stone moved to vacate the renewal on the grounds that the default judgment was void for lack of due process, in that (1) Backlund’s action was not one for personal injury, and thus the damages had to be specified in the complaint; (2) even if a statement of damages was appropriate, Backlund did not use the form the Judicial Council adopted for that purpose; and (3) Backlund failed to properly serve Stone with the statement of damages. We reject Stone’s contentions and affirm. (Id., p. 2.)

 

The court thus expressly rejected the contention the judgment was invalid because the statement of damages was served by plaintiff upon the defendant at the PO Box given in the substitution of attorney form.  As the appellate opinion teaches, in filing this form the defendant "appeared" in the action (even assuming arguendo he had not appeared before this date).  It was therefore proper under Code of Civil Procedure section 1013 to serve the statement of damages by mail at this address:

For both a statement of damages and a statement to preserve punitive damages: (1) “If a party has not appeared in the action, the statement shall be served in the same manner as a summons,” or, (2) “If the party has appeared in the action, the statement shall be served upon [their] attorney, or upon the party if [they have] appeared without an attorney, either in the same manner as a summons . . . or in the manner provided by Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1010) of Title 14.” [Citation.]

 

In this case, Stone had appeared in the action, first represented by counsel, and then self-represented. He thereby triggered the second branch, under which service may be made “upon the party if [they] have appeared without an attorney”. . . .

 

Backlund properly served her statement of damages by mailing it to the P.O. box Stone listed on his substitution of attorney form, which was the only address for Stone on file when Backlund served the statement. Stone argues that his former counsel’s office was his “address of record” when Backlund mailed the statement of damages because no notice of change of address had been filed, “regardless of whatever was written on the Substitution of Attorney form.” He thus argues that, assuming service by mail was permissible, Backlund was required to serve the statement on his former counsel, despite the notice he gave that counsel no longer represented him. This argument defies common sense. Stone’s substitution of counsel form served as a notice of change of address in this case, because it notified the court and the parties that Stone was no longer represented by his former counsel and provided Stone’s current address.

(Id., pp. 11-12; emphasis added.) 

 

Lessons for Practitioners

 

Perhaps the most important part of the decision is the discussion that gives the Court's blessing to reliance by opposing counsel upon a "new" address given by a substitution of attorney form.  As happened here, it is common for attorneys to withdraw from representation and provide little information about the client''s whereabouts, often, as is the case here, only providing a PO Box.  In these situations opposing counsel really has no choice but to rely upon the new address given on this form.  This is especially true where the substitution is signed by the party which is now self-represented, but this self-represented party is otherwise out of communication with opposing counsel.

 

 

 

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Spotlight on Rhetoric - The comments of Secretary Bessent Begs the Question About how to Call Out an Out of Control Opponent

 

Query:  When, if ever, is it appropriate to call out the tactics of an opponent by naming the perpetrator?

 

To many the answer, at least while engaging in oral argument before a court is never.  But the recent rhetoric of perhaps our best-ever Secretary of the Treasury, Scott Bessent, raises the issue.

 

As summarized by Google, Secretary Bessent named a particular Chinese Communist Party official,  Li Chenggang, as the gentleman who had been attempting to derail a crucial trade deal with inflammatory language and displays of pure aggression:

 

As of October 2025, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has publicly called out Chinese official Li Chenggang by name

. Bessent's strong criticism of Li's behavior during a visit to Washington in August 2025 led to China dismissing Li from his position as a lead trade negotiator. 

Key details of the incident:

• The officials: U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese trade negotiator Li Chenggang.
• The event: Bessent accused Li of arriving in Washington uninvited in August 2025 and acting in an "unhinged," "disrespectful," and "very incendiary" manner during trade discussions.
• The reason for the dispute: Bessent claimed Li threatened that "China will cause global chaos" if the U.S. proceeded with its plan to charge port fees on China-linked vessels.
• The outcome: In October 2025, China removed Li from his post shortly after Bessent's public comments. Li had also previously been serving as China's representative to the World Trade Organization.

 

Assuming Bessent is correct about what Mr. Li said, one many debate whether it was proper to call him out individually, and, assuming doing so was effective rhetoric (it was), what does this tell us about litigation strategy?  Most litigators have encountered opposing counsel who act unprofessionally and, even worse, may hide documents, intimidate third-party witnesses, or ignore court orders.  Though the temptation is to  mention the person by formal name in one's papers and oral argument, the generally-accepted practice is to refer to the conduct as being that of "plaintiff's counsel" or, if one can do this without a trace of irony, "my colleague on the other side."

 

This, of course, is designed to show the court the dispute is over the tactics of opposing counsel and not a personal dispute.  However, there are times it may be wise to let the court know, with grace and subtlety, that there is not a "war" between the firms or ever between the parties, though the latter certainly have issues to resolve.  Rather, the court may need to know that a particular counsel is the problem and that you would like to remain civil and have the behavior improve rather than responding in kind with a personal attack.

 

In this case, one somewhat subtle but still effective line of argument, to the effect the real issue is the conduct of a particular lawyer on that case, is the following:

 

Your honor, we are disappointed we have to bring to your attention our colleague's improper attempts to contact the witness [or whatever].  Our firm has worked well with opposing counsel's firm on prior issues, and we hope to do so in the future, but in this particular case things seem to be different and there seems to be an issue we need to have addressed.

 

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Today is the Two-Year Anniversary of the Genocidal Attack Against Israel

 

Today marks the two-year anniversary of the genocidal attack by Hamas against Israel and its people, as well as several Americans. 

 

We continue to pray for peace, the success of the new peace plan proposed by our President, and for the return of all hostages. 

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Spotlight on Excellence in Rhetoric: J.K. Rowling Explains Pointedly Why Emma Watson Is so Ignorant About Women's Rights

 J.K. Rowling:  "Adults can't expect to cosy up to an activist movement that regularly calls for a friend's assassination, then assert their right to the former friend's love, as though the friend was in fact their mother." 

 

As an appellate advocate, I like to highlight good rhetoric, whether in writing or spoken in public.  So today we highlight the recent comments from our hero and a true treasure in terms of Western Civilization, the brave and fearless J. K. Rowling.  She points out the silly and immature ignorance of those who criticize her for standing up for women's only spaces:

I'm seeing quite a bit of comment about this, so I want to make a couple of points. I'm not owed eternal agreement from any actor who once played a character I created. The idea is as ludicrous as me checking with the boss I had when I was twenty-one for what opinions I should hold these days.

 

Emma Watson and her co-stars have every right to embrace gender identity ideology. Such beliefs are legally protected, and I wouldn't want to see any of them threatened with loss of work, or violence, or death, because of them.

 

However, Emma and Dan in particular have both made it clear over the last few years that they think our former professional association gives them a particular right - nay, obligation - to critique me and my views in public. Years after they finished acting in Potter, they continue to assume the role of de facto spokespeople for the world I created. When you've known people since they were ten years old it's hard to shake a certain protectiveness. Until quite recently, I hadn't managed to throw off the memory of children who needed to be gently coaxed through their dialogue in a big scary film studio. For the past few years, I've repeatedly declined invitations from journalists to comment on Emma specifically, most notably on the Witch Trials of JK Rowling. Ironically, I told the producers that I didn't want her to be hounded as the result of anything I said.

 

The television presenter in the attached clip highlights Emma's 'all witches' speech, and in truth, that was a turning point for me, but it had a postscript that hurt far more than the speech itself. Emma asked someone to pass on a handwritten note from her to me, which contained the single sentence 'I'm so sorry for what you're going through' (she has my phone number). This was back when the death, rape and torture threats against me were at their peak, at a time when my personal security measures had had to be tightened considerably and I was constantly worried for my family's safety. Emma had just publicly poured more petrol on the flames, yet thought a one line expression of concern from her would reassure me of her fundamental sympathy and kindness.

 

Like other people who've never experienced adult life uncushioned by wealth and fame, Emma has so little experience of real life she's ignorant of how ignorant she is. She'll never need a homeless shelter. She's never going to be placed on a mixed sex public hospital ward. I'd be astounded if she's been in a high street changing room since childhood. Her 'public bathroom' is single occupancy and comes with a security man standing guard outside the door. Has she had to strip off in a newly mixed-sex changing room at a council-run swimming pool? Is she ever likely to need a state-run rape crisis centre that refuses to guarantee an all-female service? To find herself sharing a prison cell with a male rapist who's identified into the women's prison?

 

I wasn't a multimillionaire at fourteen. I lived in poverty while writing the book that made Emma famous. I therefore understand from my own life experience what the trashing of women's rights in which Emma has so enthusiastically participated means to women and girls without her privileges. The greatest irony here is that, had Emma not decided in her most recent interview to declare that she loves and treasures me - a change of tack I suspect she's adopted because she's noticed full-throated condemnation of me is no longer quite as fashionable as it was - I might never have been this honest.

 

Adults can't expect to cosy up to an activist movement that regularly calls for a friend's assassination, then assert their right to the former friend's love, as though the friend was in fact their mother. Emma is rightly free to disagree with me and indeed to discuss her feelings about me in public - but I have the same right, and I've finally decided to exercise it.

 

Brilliant words which you may find at:

https://x.com/jk_rowling/status/1972600904185483427  

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