Short take-away: Agent's admissions are not "deemed admitted" by principal (Inzunza v. Naranja)

 

Short take-away - it was error to preclude the principal from contesting factual matters deemed admitted as to the agent

The Second Appellate District, Division Four, has held that factual matters deemed admitted as to an agent do not preclude the principal from contesting liability. (Inzunza v Naranja (August 21, 2023) B318956.)  Naranja, the driver of the vehicle involved in a fatal collision with Inzunza, had factual matters "deemed admitted" against him because he failed to respond to requests that he, for example, admit he was entirely at fault and the driver of the other vehicle was not comparatively negligent.  Inzuna's heirs moved by way of a motion in limine to prohibit any party from introducing any evidence at trial that was contrary to these party admissions, effectively precluding the principal, employer CRGTS, from fully defending the action. In an opinion written by Justice Currey, the Second District held with clarity that admissions pertaining to an agent did not preclude the principal from contesting liability:

We begin with the plain language of the statute. . . section 2033.410 provides, in relevant part, that any matter deemed admitted “is conclusively established against the party making the admission” and is “binding only on that party.” (§ 2033.410, subds. (a) and (b), italics added.) It is undisputed that Inzunza failed to respond to plaintiffs’ requests for admission propounded on him, and the trial court correctly deemed the matters in the requests admitted by Inzunza. It is also undisputed, however, that CRGTS timely responded to plaintiffs’ requests for admission, and denied some of the same requests as those deemed admitted by Inzunza. . . .  The basis of plaintiffs’ action against CRGTS is vicarious liability arising from the acts of Inzunza. Vicarious liability of an employer is wholly derivative of the employee’s fault. If the employee is not at fault, the employer is not vicariously liable. [Citation.]  Thus, by precluding CRGTS from introducing evidence contesting liability, the trial court saddled it with Inzunza’s deemed admissions—making his admissions of fault binding not only on Inzunza, but also CRGTS, in violation of section 2033.410. (Id., pp. 7-8.)

Inzunza noted that while an agent's actions bind the principal, the agent's actions in failing to respond to discovery were not within the "course and scope" of employment.  The appellate court also noted that CACI No. 210 provided guidance in this area, providing in brackets that the jury, where appropriate, should be instructed, ". . . these matters must be considered true only as they apply to the party who admitted they were true.” Moreover, the directions for CACI 210 provide plainly that “The bracketed phrase should be given if there are multiple parties.” 

 

The jury should be told the agent's admissions do not bind the principal

The Second District expressly instructed the Superior Court that upon retrial the jury should be told the employee's admissions do not bind his employer.  Therefore, the text quoted above, which the jury was not given during the first trial, must be read to the jurors.

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Short-takeway - Agent of employer on hook for asking illegal questions of job applicants (Raines v. US Healthworks)

 

Short Take-away:  Agent of employer who asked invasive questions as part of a pre-employment screening may be sued under California's FEHA

Responding to a question from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the California Supreme Court has held the agent of an employer may be sued under the Fair Housing and Employment Act (FEHA) when it acts on behalf of an employer and asks intrusive questions prohibited by law. (Raines v. US Healthworks (August 24, 2023) S273630.)  Questions from defendant US Healthworks Medical Group to potential employees of the hiring employer included:

. . . USHW required job applicants to complete a written health history questionnaire that included numerous health-related questions having no bearing on the applicant’s ability to perform job-related functions. According to plaintiffs, these questions covered details of the applicant’s health history including “whether the applicant has and/or has ever had: 1) venereal disease; 2) painful or irregular vaginal discharge or pain; 3) problems with menstrual periods; 4) irregular menstrual period; 5); penile discharge, prostate problems, genital pain or masses; 6) cancer; 7) mental illness; 8) HIV; 9) permanent disabilities; 10) painful/frequent urination; 11) hair loss; 12) hemorrhoids; 13) diarrhea; 14) black stool; 15) constipation; 16) tumors; 17) organ transplant; 18) stroke; or 19) a history of tobacco or alcohol use.” In addition, the questionnaire asked whether the job applicant was pregnant, sought information regarding medications taken, and required the job applicant to disclose prior job-related injuries and illnesses. (Id., pp. 2-3.)

Justice Jenkins wrote for a unanimous court, which held that instead of the rules of common-law agency, the relevant and applicable authority was Government Code section 12940 of the FEHA.  This section provides that "[e]mployer’ includes. . .  any person. .  acting as an agent of an employer. . . ."

The Supreme Court  explained this result is supported by public policy because it makes liable the entity who (allegedly) violated FEHA, and indeed, the entity who no doubt drafted the offensive questionnaire:

If a business entity contracts with an employer to provide services that will affect that employer’s employees, and if, in providing those services, the business-entity agent violates FEHA’s antidiscrimination policies, causing injury to the employer’s employees, it is consistent with sound public policy to treat the business entity as an employer of the injured employees for purposes of applying the FEHA. This interpretation imposes FEHA liability not only on the employer but also extends it to the entity that is most directly responsible for the FEHA violation. (Id., p. 27.)

As a final comment, it is difficult to understand how US Healthworks could even consider asking such improper questions, such as whether female employees are pregnant, and not run afoul of California law.  The idea that US Healthworks may escape liability by claiming they are merely an agent of the employer seems to border on subterfuge, and, indeed may appear to be an attempt by the hiring employer and its agent to evade rules forbidding employers from asking questions that clearly violate California law.

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