Update to our prior post about the constitutional and statutory definition of "treason"
In our prior post we discussed shocking statements by elected members of a particular political party that members of the United States military should disobey the orders of the President of the United States. Our conclusion was that the definition of "treason" may be implicated by such statements, but the Constitutional and statutory definition of treason is constrained by the free speech protections of the First Amendment.
This article did not take into account the fact that two of the individuals making these statements are potentially subject military law, which does not permit those in uniform the same level of free speech protection as is afforded others. Let us take the example of two senators. Senator Duckworth is one of the authors of these remarkable statements, is currently a member of the Army reserve and the National Guard. Senator Kelley is retired military and continues to display his uniform. We thank them for their service made prior to their recent statements.
The simple fact is that statements urging our military to ignore the chain of command made by these persons potentially violates military law, notwithstanding the First Amendment.

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