Case law Update -- Service of Statement of Damages Upon Pro Se Litigant Properly Made at PO Box Listed in Substitution of Attorney Form

 

 

In an opinion written by Justice Lui, the Court of Appeal of the Second District, Division Two, of California, has upheld a default judgment against a party in propria person. (Backlund v. Stone (October 27, 2025).) (https://courts.ca.gov/opinion/published/2025-10-27/b340369 .). The court summarized the extensive factual and procedural background  of the case very succinctly:

 

In 2010, Alyssa Backlund (Backlund) sued Christopher Stone (Stone) for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and related claims. Her complaint did not specify any amounts of damages. Stone hired counsel and defended the lawsuit for some time before his counsel filed a substitution of attorney form, showing that Stone was now self-represented, and listing a P.O. box as Stone’s address. Stone then failed to appear or to defend the action, leading to his answer being stricken. Backlund mailed a statement of damages to the address Stone provided on the substitution of attorney form and then got a default judgment against him for more than $1 million. Backlund renewed the judgment almost a decade later. Stone moved to vacate the renewal on the grounds that the default judgment was void for lack of due process, in that (1) Backlund’s action was not one for personal injury, and thus the damages had to be specified in the complaint; (2) even if a statement of damages was appropriate, Backlund did not use the form the Judicial Council adopted for that purpose; and (3) Backlund failed to properly serve Stone with the statement of damages. We reject Stone’s contentions and affirm. (Id., p. 2.)

 

The court thus expressly rejected the contention the judgment was invalid because the statement of damages was served by plaintiff upon the defendant at the PO Box given in the substitution of attorney form.  As the appellate opinion teaches, in filing this form the defendant "appeared" in the action (even assuming arguendo he had not appeared before this date).  It was therefore proper under Code of Civil Procedure section 1013 to serve the statement of damages by mail at this address:

For both a statement of damages and a statement to preserve punitive damages: (1) “If a party has not appeared in the action, the statement shall be served in the same manner as a summons,” or, (2) “If the party has appeared in the action, the statement shall be served upon [their] attorney, or upon the party if [they have] appeared without an attorney, either in the same manner as a summons . . . or in the manner provided by Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1010) of Title 14.” [Citation.]

 

In this case, Stone had appeared in the action, first represented by counsel, and then self-represented. He thereby triggered the second branch, under which service may be made “upon the party if [they] have appeared without an attorney”. . . .

 

Backlund properly served her statement of damages by mailing it to the P.O. box Stone listed on his substitution of attorney form, which was the only address for Stone on file when Backlund served the statement. Stone argues that his former counsel’s office was his “address of record” when Backlund mailed the statement of damages because no notice of change of address had been filed, “regardless of whatever was written on the Substitution of Attorney form.” He thus argues that, assuming service by mail was permissible, Backlund was required to serve the statement on his former counsel, despite the notice he gave that counsel no longer represented him. This argument defies common sense. Stone’s substitution of counsel form served as a notice of change of address in this case, because it notified the court and the parties that Stone was no longer represented by his former counsel and provided Stone’s current address.

(Id., pp. 11-12; emphasis added.) 

 

Lessons for Practitioners

 

Perhaps the most important part of the decision is the discussion that gives the Court's blessing to reliance by opposing counsel upon a "new" address given by a substitution of attorney form.  As happened here, it is common for attorneys to withdraw from representation and provide little information about the client''s whereabouts, often, as is the case here, only providing a PO Box.  In these situations opposing counsel really has no choice but to rely upon the new address given on this form.  This is especially true where the substitution is signed by the party which is now self-represented, but this self-represented party is otherwise out of communication with opposing counsel.

 

 

 

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Towing legally- parked cars for unpaid tickets violates 4th Amendment (Coalition v. SF)

 

Warrantless tows of parked vehicles for past parking violations constitute an unlawful seizure of private property

As do other municipalities, the City and County of San Fransisco tows vehicles that are lawfully-parked at present for past violations of parking rules and resulting unpaid parking fines.  The unstated subtext, of course, is that there may be persons residing in these lawfully-parked vehicles as such vehicles may also be used for purposes of sleeping.  At the same time, such vehicles are often considered abandoned as they be left in a particular spot for several days. 

The Coalition for the Homeless (“Coalition”) sued the City and County of San Francisco, law enforcement, and the local transit authority (“San Francisco”).  The Coalition the towing, and thus seizure and search, of a vehicle violates the Fourth Amendment, which bars warrantless searches unless there are “exigent circumstances” and/or other recognized exceptions to the requirement a warrant is needed.  

The California Court of Appeal for the First District agreed. (Coalition on Homelessness v. City and County of San Fransisco (July 21, 2023) A164180.)  Despite broad-ranging issues involving civil liberties, due process, and the enforcement of parking rules, the appellate court stated the issue succinctly and therefore held a Fourth Amendment analysis was dispositive:

The principal issue on appeal is whether the challenged warrantless tows are permissible under the vehicular community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. We conclude respondents have not shown that legally parked cars with unpaid parking tickets that present no threat to “public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic” may be towed under that exception. In particular, we reject respondents’ argument that their interest in deterring parking violations and nonpayment of parking fines justifies warrantless tows under the vehicular community caretaking exception. Such deterrence does not justify warrantless tows of lawfully registered and lawfully parked vehicles. (Id., p. 2; footnote and citation omitted.)

As discussed below, the appellate court also rejected the argument that towing the entire vehicle for unpaid parking tickets was justified as a “forfeiture” of private property.

The supposed “community caretaking” exception to the requirement that a warrant issue before a search and/or seizure does not apply to towing legally-parked vehicles

The First District began by discussing the statute upon which San Francisco relied for the authority to tow vehicles.  Vehicle Code section 22651 permits towing of vehicles where there is notice of multiple parking violations and there is no response within 21 days. Despite this statute, the Coalition filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief.  San Francisco admitted it did not obtain a warrant before towing lawfully-parked vehicles, but argued that under section 22651 no warrant was required.  The trial court found no warrant was required pursuant to the so-called “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment and the Hon. Ethan P. Schulman of the San Francisco Superior Court therefore entered judgment for San Francisco.  Plaintiff appealed.

California has adopted Federal law as to the scope of the Fourth Amendment, and the Coalition court explained it was readily-apparent that towing a car is a “seizure” as defined by said amendment.  It also held the government has the burden of showing a particular seizure falls under one of the “few” and “specifically established” exceptions to the warrant requirement:

“ ‘A seizure conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions. The burden is on the Government to persuade the . . . court that a seizure comes under one of a few specifically established exceptions to the warrant requirement.’ ” (Miranda, supra, 429 F.3d at p. 862; see also City of Los Angeles v. Patel (2015) 576 U.S. 409, 419; Ovieda, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1041 [“ ‘The burden is on the People to establish an exception applies.’ ”].)  (Id., p. 7.)

The appellate court found that San Francisco did not meet this burden, as it did not make any showing that a legally parked car was a public safety or health threat.  This is a crucial fact as the “community caretaking” exception has only been applied where there is such a present threat.  In point of fact, Coalition analyzed the scope and history of relevant precedent and found that, in reality, there was no “community caretaking” exception to the requirement that a warrant issue; rather, there is only a “vehicular community caretaking” exception, and such applies only where, at the time of the seizure, the vehicle is parked illegally. (Id., p 11-12; original emphasis.)  Therefore, this exception must serve an “immediate public need.” (Id.)

Coalition flatly rejected the argument that such “need” includes deterring future and hypothetical violations of parking regulations by making it possible to seize a legally-parked vehicle as a result of prior parking violations which have not yet been remedied:

We do not doubt that the threat of impoundment may encourage compliance with parking laws, by owners at all income levels. However, respondents cite no authority that such deterrence is a sufficient basis for a warrantless tow of a legally parked car under the vehicular community caretaker exception. To the contrary, the Miranda [v. City of Cornelius (9th Cir. 2005) 429 F.3d 858, at 865] court expressly rejected a deterrence rationale as justification for impoundment of a vehicle that was not “actually ‘impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience’ on the streets.” (Id., p. 18; other citations omitted but original emphasis.)

Not surprisingly, San Francisco argued the failure to tow legally-parked vehicles would mean that parking citations could be ignored with “impunity.”  But Coalition explained there in fact other remedies to collect these monies other than towing a legally-parked vehicle.  For example, where there has actually been an adjudicative process as to unpaid fines, the resulting default judgment may result in towing and impoundment of a vehicle even if legally parked. (Id., p. 26.)  Further, Coalition stressed its holding did not apply where, for example, there was an immediate need for a tow, the vehicle was unregistered, or the vehicle was otherwise illegally parked. (Id., p. 20.)

Finally, the First District rejected the claim that towing a legally-parked vehicle in order to collect unpaid parking violations was akin to a “forfeiture” of private property, i.e., a supposed “progressive forfeiture” based upon the fact the vehicle may, at some point, be legally sold in order to pay unpaid parking tickets.  Cases implying a vehicle may be sold after impoundment as a “forfeiture” were not analogous because here the vehicles were not subject to forfeiture at the time of towing and therefore would only be forfeited at a later date if the amounts owed were not paid.

The appellate court’s public policy analysis was less than robust

Other than responding to the arguments set forth in the briefs, the appellate court did not utilize this opportunity to fully discuss the public policy implications of its ruling vis a vis the towing policy.  On the one hand, one may argue that Fourth Amendment protections should not depend on how courts interpret ever-shifting public policy considerations. 

But it cannot be said that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment are not based, at least in part, upon rationales that involve public policy.  For example, the well-recognized “exigent circumstances” exception is rooted in concerns for public safety and the harm to public safety from the delay occasioned by obtaining a warrant, and therefore the application of this exception cannot be divorced from public policy.  

There is no doubt that the public policy issues involved in towing a vehicle which is presumably worth several times the amount of unpaid parking tickets have many dimensions.  For example, to the extent someone lives in the vehicle, such persons may now have nowhere to sleep.  

Further, the primary beneficiary of the towing policy may often be the towing company itself when one considers the increasingly large fees charged to tow and impound vehicles.  At the same time, general knowledge that warrantless tows of legally-parked vehicle are forbidden does nothing to encourage payment of parking tickets.  Further, the due process which a default judgment affords a vehicle owner prior to the vehicle being impounded benefits the owner but not necessarily the municipality.  The rejoinder is that the Fourth Amendment is not designed for the purpose of making law enforcement more efficient but in order to protect private citizens from governmental intrusion, and therefore applies even where its effect is quite the opposite.