(a) Application
This sanctions rule applies to the rules in the California Rules of Court relating to general civil cases, unlawful detainer cases, probate proceedings, civil proceedings in the appellate division of the superior court, and small claims cases.
(Subd (a) amended effective January 1, 2004; adopted effective July 1, 2001.)
(b) Sanctions
In addition to any other sanctions permitted by law, the court may order a person, after written notice and an opportunity to be heard, to pay reasonable monetary sanctions to the court or an aggrieved person, or both, for failure without good cause to comply with the applicable rules. For the purposes of this rule, "person" means a party, a party's attorney, a witness, and an insurer or any other individual or entity whose consent is necessary for the disposition of the case. If a failure to comply with an applicable rule is the responsibility of counsel and not of the party, any penalty must be imposed on counsel and must not adversely affect the party's cause of action or defense thereto.
(Subd (b) amended effective January 1, 2007; adopted as untitled subdivision effective January 1, 1985; amended and relettered effective July 1, 2001; previously amended effective January 1, 1994, and January 1, 2004.)
(c) Notice and procedure
Sanctions must not be imposed under this rule except on noticed motion by the party seeking sanctions or on the court's own motion after the court has provided notice and an opportunity to be heard. A party's motion for sanctions must (1) state the applicable rule that has been violated, (2) describe the specific conduct that is alleged to have violated the rule, and (3) identify the attorney, law firm, party, witness, or other person against whom sanctions are sought. The court on its own motion may issue an order to show cause that must (1) state the applicable rule that has been violated, (2) describe the specific conduct that appears to have violated the rule, and (3) direct the attorney, law firm, party, witness, or other person to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed against them for violation of the rule.
(Subd (c) amended effective January 1, 2007; adopted effective July 1, 2001; previously amended effective January 1, 2004.)
(d) Award of expenses
In addition to the sanctions awardable under (b), the court may order the person who has violated an applicable rule to pay to the party aggrieved by the violation that party's reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees and costs, incurred in connection with the motion for sanctions or the order to show cause.
(Subd (d) amended effective January 1, 2007; adopted effective July 1, 2001; previously amended effective January 1, 2004.)
(e) Order
An order imposing sanctions must be in writing and must recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.
While plaintiff and appellant Brenda Lee Allen and her family were moving out of Ontario Airport Inn Hotel after an extended stay, she and the hotel owner, defendant and respondent Anil Bhula Patel, and the hotel manager, Luis Mejia, engaged in an altercation. Allen alleges that during the incident, Patel attacked and injured her. Allen brought a personal injury lawsuit against Patel and his company, DH Hotel Investments, Inc. (DH) (collectively referred to as defendant). A jury awarded Allen over one million dollars in compensatory damages, and the court declared a mistrial at the bifurcated trial on her punitive damages claim, and thereafter granted defendant’s motion for a new trial (MNT). Allen appeals. Allen contends the trial court abused its discretion by granting the MNT based on attorney misconduct. . . . We affirm the trial court’s order granting a new trial of phase one of the trial as to liability and compensatory damages. . . . The appellate court also found the trial court had properly granted a new trial based upon misconduct by Mr. Blue in making an argument to the jury which improperly speculated as to discussions between defendant and defense counsel, speculating that defense counsel told his client he would essentially get away with his bad conduct. (Id., p. 2.
During attorney Michael K. Blue’s opening statement on behalf of Allen, he told the jury that it would hear from Allen’s doctors and that there would be testimony that, after her altercation with Patel at the Hotel, she suffered from incontinence and PTSD, which she will suffer from for the rest of her life. Blue described in detail Allen’s incontinence. Blue requested the jury to award Allen $6,000,000 in compensatory damages. After Blue completed his opening statement, defendant moved for a mistrial on the grounds that Blue raised new and argumentative issues that were never disclosed before. Defendant argued that Blue improperly stated during his opening statement that Allen was immunocompromised and suffered from a bone disease. Defendant asserted that this was improper because Allen’s attorneys would not be providing any medical testimony by any designated medical physician, establishing these diagnoses or prognoses. The trial court responded that Allen’s treating physician could testify regarding his own diagnoses but could not testify regarding other diagnoses or causation unless designated as an expert witness. Will we tolerate that? That decision is going to be your decision in just a few moments. (Id., pp. 6-7.)
After hearing oral argument on July 19, 2023, on Patel’s MNT, the trial court ordered a new trial. During the hearing, the trial court stated in detail its reasons. The court found that Allen’s evidence was tainted by Blue’s misconduct. The court explained that it had granted several motions in limine (MIL) orders, which Blue violated. The trial court expressed concerns about Allen introducing evidence of bowel and G.I. issues, which Allen claimed were caused by the Hotel incident. The trial court asked Blue if there would be evidence offered by an expert showing causation linking Allen’s GI claims with the Hotel incident, and Blue told the court, yes, which was false. (Id., p. 8.)
We conclude there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the trial court’s findings that Blue made knowingly false and misleading statements and elicited inadmissible, prejudicial, and highly inflammatory testimony in violation of the court’s orders and warnings not to introduce evidence of Allen’s incontinence unless Blue was able to introduce expert witness testimony establishing a medical diagnosis of her condition and that it was caused by the Hotel incident. (Id., p. 25.)
Blue began his opening statement by stating, “I’m scared. I couldn’t sleep last night because I’m scared. It’s an enormous obligation to represent somebody who cannot represent themselves. . . . I’m shaking. My knees are shaking. . . . It’s a privilege of a lifetime. . . when you believe in somebody. My fear is that I have not done a good enough job to represent that person the way that person deserved to be represented that I have failed. And at some point I’m going to hand this case . . . to you for you to take this case for me. And that scares me to death.”The appellate court also found the trial court had properly granted a new trial based upon misconduct by Mr. Blue in making an argument to the jury which improperly speculated as to discussions between defendant and defense counsel, Mr. Blue telling the jury that defense counsel may have told defendant they would essentially get away with his bad conduct. (Id., p. 33.)
Blue then told the jury it had “an opportunity to make a difference. We go through life, try to set an example, try and do the right thing. Maybe somebody will see. Maybe our children will see. Maybe our students will see. But seldom do we have an opportunity to defend our community, to champion our community, to stand as the last bastion for what we will tolerate for our community. Will we tolerate men coming into a room with a vulnerable woman, the most vulnerable of us and put their hands on her? Will we tolerate that? That decision is going to be your decision in just a few moments. (Id., p. 30.)
California Supreme Court 2026