Short take-away - it was error to preclude the principal from contesting factual matters deemed admitted as to the agent
The Second Appellate District, Division Four, has held that factual matters deemed admitted as to an agent do not preclude the principal from contesting liability. (Inzunza v Naranja (August 21, 2023) B318956.) Naranja, the driver of the vehicle involved in a fatal collision with Inzunza, had factual matters "deemed admitted" against him because he failed to respond to requests that he, for example, admit he was entirely at fault and the driver of the other vehicle was not comparatively negligent. Inzuna's heirs moved by way of a motion in limine to prohibit any party from introducing any evidence at trial that was contrary to these party admissions, effectively precluding the principal, employer CRGTS, from fully defending the action. In an opinion written by Justice Currey, the Second District held with clarity that admissions pertaining to an agent did not preclude the principal from contesting liability:
We begin with the plain language of the statute. . . section 2033.410 provides, in relevant part, that any matter deemed admitted “is conclusively established against the party making the admission” and is “binding only on that party.” (§ 2033.410, subds. (a) and (b), italics added.) It is undisputed that Inzunza failed to respond to plaintiffs’ requests for admission propounded on him, and the trial court correctly deemed the matters in the requests admitted by Inzunza. It is also undisputed, however, that CRGTS timely responded to plaintiffs’ requests for admission, and denied some of the same requests as those deemed admitted by Inzunza. . . . The basis of plaintiffs’ action against CRGTS is vicarious liability arising from the acts of Inzunza. Vicarious liability of an employer is wholly derivative of the employee’s fault. If the employee is not at fault, the employer is not vicariously liable. [Citation.] Thus, by precluding CRGTS from introducing evidence contesting liability, the trial court saddled it with Inzunza’s deemed admissions—making his admissions of fault binding not only on Inzunza, but also CRGTS, in violation of section 2033.410. (Id., pp. 7-8.)
Inzunza noted that while an agent's actions bind the principal, the agent's actions in failing to respond to discovery were not within the "course and scope" of employment. The appellate court also noted that CACI No. 210 provided guidance in this area, providing in brackets that the jury, where appropriate, should be instructed, ". . . these matters must be considered true only as they apply to the party who admitted they were true.” Moreover, the directions for CACI 210 provide plainly that “The bracketed phrase should be given if there are multiple parties.”
The jury should be told the agent's admissions do not bind the principal
The Second District expressly instructed the Superior Court that upon retrial the jury should be told the employee's admissions do not bind his employer. Therefore, the text quoted above, which the jury was not given during the first trial, must be read to the jurors.
