Case Law Update: 1.1 Million Default Upheld Without Statement of Damages Being Served

 

 

In Atlas v. Davidyan (August 29, 2025) case no. BC335661, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Eight, upheld a default judgment of over $1,100,000.00.  The court upheld this judgment, and related orders of the Hon. Holly J. Fujie of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, from a challenge by the defendant, who was self-represented in the Superior Court.  Though an answer was filed and the case ostensibly litigated by the defense, a terminating sanction was granted in favor of plaintiff, thus striking the answer to the complaint, after the defendant failed to fully respond to discovery following many orders that he do so.

 

The defense argued what was called a "doomsday" sanction was an "abuse of discretion."   This is because even though the responses were admittedly deficient, that there was in fact some sort of response to the discovery provided.  Writing for the Court, Justice Rubin dispatched this argument by noting the trial court took an "incremental and non-punitive" approach to discovery sanctions:

 

The trial court imposed terminating sanctions only after hearing eight previous motions for discovery non-compliance, and only after taking a patient and cautious approach to the discovery dispute. After plaintiff’s first motion to compel, the court gave defendant more time to respond. When defendant still did not provide complete or adequate written discovery responses, the court imposed moderate monetary sanctions and set new response deadlines in four more discovery hearings between December 2021 and January 2023. When these orders to compel and monetary sanctions proved insufficient to induce compliance, the court imposed issue sanctions. When even this severe penalty did not result in discovery compliance, the court imposed terminating sanctions. The court took exactly the incremental and non-punitive approach contemplated by the discovery statutes. (Id., p. 13.)

 

Of note is the argument by the defense there was no proper "notice" of the damages to be awarded because no Statement of Damages was filed and served per the procedure in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.11.  However, the appellate court found the complaint itself gave sufficient notice: of the amount of damages the defendant might have to pay:

 

But his argument fails for the simple
reason that plaintiff’s complaint states that she is seeking general damages [for] mental injuries and economic loss”; she sought “general and special damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but no less than $1,000,000,” as well as attorney fees pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.5, subdivision (a). Thus, there was no need for a section 425.11 statement and defendant was properly “apprised of [his] exposure” before the default was taken. (Id., p. 14.)

 

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Case law update - in Calfornia, employer and employee may prospectively waive 30-minute lunch break

 

 

Sanity prevails, as employer and employee may prospectively waive 30-minute lunch break after five hours

The Second District of the Court of Appeal for the State of California has decided the rule that employees are entitled to a 30-minute lunch break after five hours may be waived, in writing and in advance of the actual work day, as long as the waiver is not coerced. (Bradsbery v. Vicar Operating Inc. (April 21, 2025) case no. B322799.) The appellate court put the question succinctly, noting that the issue involved a written waiver of the statutory right of an employee working but less than six hours or more to have a 30-minute rest period to occur after five hours of work.  While the statute provides that employees working more than five but less than six hours may “waive” their meal period, the statute is silent as to whether this waiver may occur in advance and in writing, as opposed to being waived orally on an ad hoc basis, thus creating the ambiguity that the Court of Appeal addressed:

The Legislature and the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) have determined a meal period for work shifts between five and six hours may be waived. The question before us is narrow and of first impression: whether the mutual waiver of that meal period by an employer and employee can occur prospectively and in writing. Labor Code section 512 guarantees a 30-minute, off-duty meal period for employees after five work hours and a second meal period after 10 work hours. Section 512 also provides that, for shifts between five and six hours, the first meal period “may be waived by mutual consent of both the employer and employee.”
(Id., p. 1.)

The Court found against the employee's argument that the waiver the employee signed violated California law:

We conclude the revocable, prospective waivers Plaintiffs signed are enforceable in the absence of any evidence the waivers are unconscionable or unduly coercive. The prospective written waiver of a 30-minute meal period for shifts between five and six hours accords with the text and purpose of section 512 and Wage Order Nos. 4 and 5. (Id., p. 2.)

Key to this conclusion was the Court’s analysis as to legislative intent, noting that the legislative history did not suggest an intent to prohibit prospective waivers of meal periods:

Our fundamental task is to ascertain the purpose of section 512 and the wage orders, with an eye to promoting “‘“the protection and benefit of employees.”’” (McLean v. State of California (2016) 1 Cal.5th 615, 622; accord, Stone, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1052; Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1026-1027.) We conclude the text of section 512 and Wage Order Nos. 4 and 5, as well as the legislative and administrative history, indicate the Legislature and IWC did not intend to prohibit prospective written meal period waivers.
 (Id., p. 21.)

This decision is important because not only do certain employers encourage these written waivers, but other employers force their employees to take a 30-minute meal period after five hours even if the employee is strongly against doing so, fearing the employee will later claim they were denied their lunch or dinner break.

 

 

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Breaking: California Supreme Court Permits Bill to Advance Despite lack of 30 days Notice, Advancing Governor Newsom’s Gerrymandering Plan

As reported by the San Francisco Chronicle (https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/california-supreme-court-clears-way-newsom-s-20826777.php), the As reported by the San Francisco Chronicle (https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/california-supreme-court-clears-way-newsom-s-20826777.php), the California Supreme Court has rejected a challenge to Democrat Governor Newsom‘s hasty plan for a ballot initiative on tap for the November election.  The idea is to further "gerrymander" California’s elections so as to make certain fewer, if any, dissenting parties may be elected, this being the plan even though the Democrats already possess a super majority in their legislature and have no real opposition to any tax increases, new regulations limiting the freedom of individuals, etc.
 
California law requires, of course, that bills have a 30–day "notice" period, ostensibly to give notice to the populace about Sacramento's latest scheme.  However, in order to rush the ballot initiative, the Democrats refused to give this notice, correctly predicting the California Supreme Court would, so to speak, turn the other cheek. They did what is called "gut and amend,” and took an existing bill and changed almost every word under the bizarre and illogical rubric that this gives “notice“ for a 30-day period because the original (and different) bill was promulgated earlier in time. Which, of course, it does not. 
The Supreme Court of California has rejected a challenge to this procedure, ruling by way of an order that provides no explanation of its rationale. While such summary orders rejecting challenges in this manner are common, in this case, it would’ve been useful to know something about the reasoning.  Is it that the  Supreme Court does not wish to wade into the political arena of redistricting by giving a legal opinion as to what constitutes "30-day notice," or does the Court, in fact, give its blessing to the gut-and-amend strategy?t has rejected a challenge to Democrat Governor Newsom‘s hasty plan for a ballot initiative on tap for the November election.  The idea is to further "gerrymander" California’s elections so as to make certain fewer, if any, dissenting parties may be elected, this being the plan even though the Democrats already possess a super majority in their legislature and have no real opposition to any tax increases, new regulations limiting the freedom of individuals, etc.
 
California law requires, of course, that bills have a 30–day "notice" period, ostensibly to give notice to the populace about Sacramento's latest scheme.  However, in order to rush the ballot initiative, the Democrats refused to give this notice, correctly predicting the California Supreme Court would, so to speak, turn the other cheek. They did what is called "gut and amend,” and took an existing bill and changed almost every word under the bizarre and illogical rubric that this gives “notice“ for a 30-day period because the original (and different) bill was promulgated earlier in time. Which, of course, it does not. 
As reported by the San Francisco Chronicle (https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/california-supreme-court-clears-way-newsom-s-20826777.php), the As reported by the San Francisco Chronicle (https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/california-supreme-court-clears-way-newsom-s-20826777.php), the California Supreme Court has rejected a challenge to Democrat Governor Newsom‘s hasty plan for a ballot initiative on tap for the November election.  The idea is to further "gerrymander" California’s elections so as to make certain fewer, if any, dissenting parties may be elected, this being the plan even though the Democrats already possess a super majority in their legislature and have no real opposition to any tax increases, new regulations limiting the freedom of individuals, etc.
 
California law requires, of course, that bills have a 30–day "notice" period, ostensibly to give notice to the populace about Sacramento's latest scheme.  However, in order to rush the ballot initiative, the Democrats refused to give this notice, correctly predicting the California Supreme Court would, so to speak, turn the other cheek. They did what is called "gut and amend,” and took an existing bill and changed almost every word under the bizarre and illogical rubric that this gives “notice“ for a 30-day period because the original (and different) bill was promulgated earlier in time. Which, of course, it does not. 
The Supreme Court of California has rejected a challenge to this procedure, ruling by way of an order that provides no explanation of its rationale. While such summary orders rejecting challenges in this manner are common, in this case, it would’ve been useful to know something about the reasoning.  Is it that the  Supreme Court does not wish to wade into the political arena of redistricting by giving a legal opinion as to what constitutes "30-day notice," or does the Court, in fact, give its blessing to the gut-and-amend strategy?t has rejected a challenge to Democrat Governor Newsom‘s hasty plan for a ballot initiative on tap for the November election.  The idea is to further "gerrymander" California’s elections so as to make certain fewer, if any, dissenting parties may be elected, this being the plan even though the Democrats already possess a super majority in their legislature and have no real opposition to any tax increases, new regulations limiting the freedom of individuals, etc.
 
California law requires, of course, that bills have a 30–day "notice" period, ostensibly to give notice to the populace about Sacramento's latest scheme.  However, in order to rush the ballot initiative, the Democrats refused to give this notice, correctly predicting the California Supreme Court would, so to speak, turn the other cheek. They did what is called "gut and amend,” and took an existing bill and changed almost every word under the bizarre and illogical rubric that this gives “notice“ for a 30-day period because the original (and different) bill was promulgated earlier in time. Which, of course, it does not.

 
The Supreme Court of California has just rejected a challenge to this procedure, ruling by way of an order that provides no explanation as to its rationale. While such summary orders rejecting challenges in this manner are common, in this case, it would’ve been useful to know something about the reasoning.  Is it that the  Supreme Court does not wish to wade into the political arena of redistricting by giving a legal opinion as to what constitutes "30-day notice," or does the Court, in fact, give its blessing to the gut-and-amend strategy? 

 

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Is the ability of so-called “artificial intelligence” and, indeed, mathematics in general, to predict how economic systems behave ultimately flawed?

How high school student Hannah Cairo has shown the limits in predicting systemic behavior

There is no doubt that artificial intelligence or “AI” has been touted as enabling systems to run more efficiently and particularly for software to monitor and project (and even ultimately control) the behavior of systems.  But as a slew of recent articles point out (see Slacker at https://stacker.news/items/1080616 and Breitbart at https://www.breitbart.com/economy/2025/08/14/breitbart-business-digest-what-a-new-math-breakthrough-means-for-economics/), mathematical assumptions that underlie the idea that data from part of the system may predict outcomes in another part of the system can be just that:  a mere assumption.  This is because a high school student named Hannah Cairo has apparently disproven the Mizohata–Takeuchi conjecture, which is, in a nutshell, that the lack of movement or “amplitude” in one part of a system could be used to presume quietness in the rest of the system.  

As Slacker explains:

In February, a high school student from California who goes by the name Hannah Cairo accomplished what top mathematicians had failed to do for more than 40 years: disprove the Mizohata–Takeuchi conjecture. The breakthrough arrived in a 14-page preprint posted online, and its consequences stretch far beyond the realm of pure mathematics. Economists, policymakers, and risk managers would be wise to take note.
The Mizohata–Takeuchi conjecture had long been a comforting idea in mathematical analysis. It proposed that for certain kinds of ideal systems—linear partial differential equations with real analytic coefficients—local quietude implied global stillness. In other words, if the solution to one of these equations vanished on some open patch of space, then it had to vanish everywhere. That elegant rule served as a foundation for intuition about how waves, signals, and other smooth systems behave.
The new work destroys that foundation. Cairo constructed a counterexample: a solution that is identically zero in some open region—perfectly flat, no signal at all—but distinctly nonzero elsewhere. All the required conditions are met. The equation behaves according to the supposed rules. And yet the rule fails.
This disproof doesn’t just matter to analysts of the abstract. It should unsettle anyone who builds models or draws conclusions from partial observations—especially in macroeconomics, finance, and policy.

This may mean, for example, that the blatantly flawed predictions about economics may result, at least in part, from the fact that our assumptions about the system based upon part of the system are flawed.  Perhaps this also explains why “climate change“ predictions, based upon incomplete data of what climate systems are doing today, have been so wrong when making predictions about the near and medium-term future.

Put in a broader context, this mathematical breakthrough may indicate that predictions an AI agent and/or other autonomous software can predict how a system, including economic systems and computer networks, will behave based upon data from one part of the system, simply does not follow.  For those who believe we can predict the climate based upon our incomplete data, this has broad implications.  Again, a quote from Slacker:

For those of us that thought that mathematical models of economy or weather or lots of other complex systems would not work well all the time, this is one of the reasons that they do not work.
 

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Text of the California Anti-Parody Statute Ripe for Appellate Review on Constitutional Grounds

 

California's AB 730 prohibits use of digital tools to make fun of candidates for public office

 

In our prior post we discussed challenges to a new California law making it a crime to parody political figures using digital tools such as Artificial Intelligence under the rubric the public, and, in particular, voters must be "protected" from such. 

 

The text of this new law, in all its breadth, is set forth below with key portions italicized, including provisions making it illegal to use digital tools to create a "false representation" of a candidate or, God forbid, harm their reputation:

 

 

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1.

 Section 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:

35.

 (a) Proceedings in cases involving the registration or denial of registration of voters, the certification or denial of certification of candidates, the certification or denial of certification of ballot measures, election contests, and actions under Section 20010 of the Elections Code shall be placed on the calendar in the order of their date of filing and shall be given precedence.

(b) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2023, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2023, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 2.

 Section 35 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure, to read:

35.

 (a) Proceedings in cases involving the registration or denial of registration of voters, the certification or denial of certification of candidates, the certification or denial of certification of ballot measures, and election contests shall be placed on the calendar in the order of their date of filing and shall be given precedence.

(b) This section shall become operative January 1, 2023.

SEC. 3.

 Section 20010 of the Elections Code is amended to read:

20010.

 (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), a person, firm, association, corporation, campaign committee, or organization shall not, with actual malice, produce, distribute, publish, or broadcast campaign material that contains (1) a picture or photograph of a person or persons into which the image of a candidate for public office is superimposed or (2) a picture or photograph of a candidate for public office into which the image of another person or persons is superimposed. “Campaign material” includes, but is not limited to, any printed matter, advertisement in a newspaper or other periodical, television commercial, or computer image. For purposes of this section, “actual malice” means the knowledge that the image of a person has been superimposed on a picture or photograph to create a false representation, or a reckless disregard of whether or not the image of a person has been superimposed on a picture or photograph to create a false representation.

(b) A person, firm, association, corporation, campaign committee, or organization may produce, distribute, publish, or broadcast campaign material that contains a picture or photograph prohibited by subdivision (a) only if each picture or photograph in the campaign material includes the following statement in the same point size type as the largest point size type used elsewhere in the campaign material: “This picture is not an accurate representation of fact.” The statement shall be immediately adjacent to each picture or photograph prohibited by subdivision (a).

(c) (1) Any registered voter may seek a temporary restraining order and an injunction prohibiting the publication, distribution, or broadcasting of any campaign material in violation of this section. Upon filing a petition under this section, the plaintiff may obtain a temporary restraining order in accordance with Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(2) A candidate for public office whose likeness appears in a picture or photograph prohibited by subdivision (a) may bring a civil action against any person, firm, association, corporation, campaign committee, or organization that produced, distributed, published, or broadcast the picture or photograph prohibited by subdivision (a). The court may award damages in an amount equal to the cost of producing, distributing, publishing, or broadcasting the campaign material that violated this section, in addition to reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

(d) (1) This section does not apply to a holder of a license granted pursuant to the federal Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seq.) in the performance of the functions for which the license is granted.

(2) This section does not apply to the publisher or an employee of a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical that is published on a regular basis for any material published in that newspaper, magazine, or other periodical. For purposes of this subdivision, a “newspaper, magazine, or other periodical that is published on a regular basis” does not include any newspaper, magazine, or other periodical that has as its primary purpose the publication of campaign advertising or communication, as defined by Section 304.

(e) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2023.

SEC. 4.

 Section 20010 is added to the Elections Code, to read:

20010.

 (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), a person, committee, as defined in Section 82013 of the Government Code, or other entity shall not, within 60 days of an election at which a candidate for elective office will appear on the ballot, distribute, with actual malice, materially deceptive audio or visual media, as defined in subdivision (e), of the candidate with the intent to injure the candidate’s reputation or to deceive a voter into voting for or against the candidate.

(b) (1) The prohibition in subdivision (a) does not apply if the audio or visual media includes a disclosure stating: “This _____ has been manipulated.”

(2) The blank in the disclosure required by paragraph (1) shall be filled with whichever of the following terms most accurately describes the media:

(A) Image.

(B) Video.

(C) Audio.

(3) (A) For visual media, the text of the disclosure shall appear in a size that is easily readable by the average viewer and no smaller than the largest font size of other text appearing in the visual media. If the visual media does not include any other text, the disclosure shall appear in a size that is easily readable by the average viewer. For visual media that is video, the disclosure shall appear for the duration of the video.

(B) If the media consists of audio only, the disclosure shall be read in a clearly spoken manner and in a pitch that can be easily heard by the average listener, at the beginning of the audio, at the end of the audio, and, if the audio is greater than two minutes in length, interspersed within the audio at intervals of not greater than two minutes each.

(c) (1) A candidate for elective office whose voice or likeness appears in a materially deceptive audio or visual media distributed in violation of this section may seek injunctive or other equitable relief prohibiting the distribution of audio or visual media in violation of this section. An action under this paragraph shall be entitled to precedence in accordance with Section 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(2) A candidate for elective office whose voice or likeness appears in a materially deceptive audio or visual media distributed in violation of this section may bring an action for general or special damages against the person, committee, or other entity that distributed the materially deceptive audio or visual media. The court may also award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. This subdivision shall not be construed to limit or preclude a plaintiff from securing or recovering any other available remedy.

(3) In any civil action alleging a violation of this section, the plaintiff shall bear the burden of establishing the violation through clear and convincing evidence.

(d) (1) This section shall not be construed to alter or negate any rights, obligations, or immunities of an interactive service provider under Section 230 of Title 47 of the United States Code.

(2) This section does not apply to a radio or television broadcasting station, including a cable or satellite television operator, programmer, or producer, that broadcasts materially deceptive audio or visual media prohibited by this section as part of a bona fide newscast, news interview, news documentary, or on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events, if the broadcast clearly acknowledges through content or a disclosure, in a manner that can be easily heard or read by the average listener or viewer, that there are questions about the authenticity of the materially deceptive audio or visual media.

(3) This section does not apply to a radio or television broadcasting station, including a cable or satellite television operator, programmer, or producer, when it is paid to broadcast materially deceptive audio or visual media.

(4) This section does not apply to an internet website, or a regularly published newspaper, magazine, or other periodical of general circulation, including an internet or electronic publication, that routinely carries news and commentary of general interest, and that publishes materially deceptive audio or visual media prohibited by this section, if the publication clearly states that the materially deceptive audio or visual media does not accurately represent the speech or conduct of the candidate.

(5) This section does not apply to materially deceptive audio or visual media that constitutes satire or parody.

(e) As used in this section, “materially deceptive audio or visual media” means an image or an audio or video recording of a candidate’s appearance, speech, or conduct that has been intentionally manipulated in a manner such that both of the following conditions are met:

(1) The image or audio or video recording would falsely appear to a reasonable person to be authentic.

(2) The image or audio or video recording would cause a reasonable person to have a fundamentally different understanding or impression of the expressive content of the image or audio or video recording than that person would have if the person were hearing or seeing the unaltered, original version of the image or audio or video recording.

(f) The provisions of this section are severable. If any provision of this section or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

(g) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2023, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2023, deletes or extends that date.

 

(See https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB730.)

 

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Update: The War on Parody by Humorless Left-Wing Scolds Hits Roadblock

 

Federal Judge Finds that California law banning AI-generated fake videos unlawful but not unconstitutional, setting up issue for further judicial review.

Those who do not want their political views satirized — because these views are so silly they are ripe for humor — have attempted to ban such speech under the rubric that such is “misleading”, “dangerous,” etc.  Indeed, they have made quite the effort over the last few years to ban, prosecute, and silence parody.  The Christian satirical website Babylon Bee has taken the brunt of much of this effort, as those who attempt to censor in the name of “safety” have labeled the site “misinformation.” (See  https://www.newsweek.com/satire-misinformation-babylon-bee-says-mocking-woke-moral-purpose-1779062” where left-wing Newsweek — which no doubt covets it own First Amendment protection — took the stance that there is a real concern that such parody is “misinformation.”)  Indeed, the New York Times sold it soul to eschew freedom of speech and did its best to silence the Babylon Bee, as Newsweek pointed out:

In March, 2021, a New York Times reporter using information from Snopes [an online "fact checking" service which the New York Post termed "pants on fire partisans"] described the Babylon Bee as a "far-right misinformation site" that "trafficked in misinformation."

No wonder — BabylonBee videos include an appearance by Satan himself bemoaning the fact that Roe v. Wade was overturned and fewer babies may die. (See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0LI4UEHUvtM, and note that even today Google’s YouTube tries to counter this satire by a note attempting to characterize the end of a human life as “the loss of a pregnancy” as if the baby was simply "misplaced.") 

Of course, the Babylon Bee has fired back against left-wing cancel culture with headlines such as this “Trump Tweet Reading ‘Good Morning America’ Labeled as “Misinformation:’”

 

(See https://babylonbee.com/news/trump-tweet-reading-good-morning-america-labeled-as-misinformation.)

But this effort took an even darker turn with the prosecution and sentencing of Douglas MacKay by the Biden-era Department of Justice for jokingly asking Hillary Clinton’s voters to “vote by text,” implying they were so stupid they might do so.  I intend to repeat this tweet in the future, so if AOC wins the 2028 election and my posting stops, you will know that I, too have been arrested.  Of course, there is no humor associated with (hashtag) “I’m With Her” cabal so he was prosecuted for doing so.  The Department of Justice still lists this on its website as one of its accomplishments (https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/social-media-influencer-douglass-mackey-sentenced-after-conviction-election) and the website still lists someone as the “contact” for the prosecution, with no apparent embarrassment regarding the individuals listed:

Contact

John Marzulli


Danielle Blustein Hass


U.S. Attorney's Office

(718) 254-6323

(See https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/social-media-influencer-douglass-mackey-sentenced-after-conviction-election.)

This suit was, of course, brought in the Eastern District of New York, where fine American citizens found Mr. Mackay guilty of a crime for a very humorous tweet.

Which brings us to California’s recent law banning AI “fakes,” including — of course — political satire.  There are reports that this law  was specifically designed to ban videos such as one published on “X” where (an edited) Kamala Harris called herself the “ultimate diversity hire.”  This was offensive because, according to those who supported the law, she did not say this and she certainly was nothing like a diversity hire.

As reported by Politico (see https://www.politico.com/news/2025/08/05/elon-musk-x-court-win-california-deepfake-law-00494936), yesterday one Federal Judge, the Hon. John Mendez, ruled that the law did not pass muster because it is preempted by Federal Law protecting platforms from claims for user-generated content.  As Politico explained, the Federal Court did not need to, and therefore did not, rule on the obvious First Amendment issues.

This is important because the broad use of the term “deep fake” may be used to attempt to ban speech under the guise that we are “protecting” the public.  Given that even content generated by analog means, such as a photograph, will likely be edited by software which includes some sort of AI tools (even if these tools merely add a border to a photo), a ban on “AI-generated” content at election time, which is what Governor Newsom and his legislative cohorts attempted, potentially bans all political satire created by digital tools.

Given that this law is still enforceable in other contexts, the issue of using digital tools for political satire and attempts to ban such requires further judicial review.  At some point, then, the Supreme Court will need to reiterate that satire and humor and pointed and sharp speech about elections and political issues are at the heart of what the First Amendment protects.  

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