Hypothetical - when United States District Court judges set policy by national injunction, which injunction prevails?

 

Which "universal injunction" takes precedence when the hundreds of District Court Judges are allowed to set nation-wide policy?
 
The following hypothetical, which is answered below, illustrates the importance of today's Castro v. Trump opinion.
 
Let us suppose that one United States District Court judge denies a request for a nationwide injunction to bar deportation of illegal aliens, which aliens have already been issued (more than several months ago), a final order of removal and who argue that they are still entitled to challenge their impending removal to third-party countries as opposed to the country of their citizenship.  This court finds the aliens are likely, if not certainly, to lose on the merits because the 30-day time limit to challenge the original order of removal has long passed.

Suppose another judge facing the same issue rules that such an injunction is warranted by “equity,“ and that the United States government must afford these aliens an additional 30 days to appeal being moved to a third-party country, setting this 30 day deadline regarding where they are being taken as a mirror image of the prior 30 day deadline to appeal the final order of removal, which original deadline, as noted has long since passed.

A third District Court judge issues a similar injunction stating that even though these persons about to be deported to a third country are now entitled to additional “due process“ and have the right to challenge their deportation to a third country rather than the country in which they are a citizen.  However, this third judge does not set a specific deadline, instead relying on the litigants to argue over “due process" they are entitled to in each of their cases, stating the amount of "due process" which each is entitled-to depends on the practicalities of their bringing a challenge to third-party deportation while in custody. 

The question becomes which ruling, meaning which "universal" or "nationwide" injunction, or, for that matter, which ruling against such an injunction, constitutes precedence as to other persons who are not named in the suit are similarly situated.  We assume, of course, that the orders granting the injunction are written broadly to cover all persons.  To make this a bit more interesting, we will suppose that each injunction is issued in a different District Court in a different Judicial Circuit, and that each of these Circuit Courts has refused requests to issue a stay of these trial court orders. We will also assume the Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on the issue of whether there is to be additional due process where there is to be removal to a third-party country.

The question, then, is:  which injunction ruling will prevail in other parts of the United States? 
 
The answer, at least according to leading law firms , is the government must abide by each injunction issued, even if not fully  harmonious or in outright conflict
 
Our hypothetical is of course, similar to other recent injunction issued by Federal "trial court" Judges who have exercised virtually unlimited jurisdiction and attempted to control the execution of public policy by the executive branch, such as the direction of planes, the whereabouts of foreign citizens held in foreign jails, etc.  Given that so many injunctions have been sought and granted, with counsel often from leading law firms, the  question is which universal injunction should prevail when they are, to say the least, not entirely in sync. 
 
The answer, of course, coming from the positions taken by many of the leading law firms in America, is that all of them prevail. This is because these law firms have argued for such broad jurisdiction that there is little, if any limit, on what an individual trial court judge may do.  These suits seeking universal injunctions are usually brought in “equity” and, as these major law firms have argued, the jurisdiction of federal trial courts extends far beyond the litigants before them.
 

 

 

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United States v. Skrmetti: Justice Thomas' concurring opinion upholding the right of state legislatures to bar treatment deemed harmful to minors

 

Six of the nine Supreme Court justices reject challenge to Tennessee law designed to "protect" minors

The United States Supreme Court has upheld the right of state legislatures to bar medical procedures used by minors, even where the minor's parents and some medical professionals believe these procedures are beneficial, based on the decision by the people's representatives that these procedures are harmful to minors. (United States v. Skfmatti (June 18, 2025) no. 23–477) found at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-477_2cp3.pdf.  This issue arose when the Tennessee legislature passed a ban on a host of such treatments, including puberty-blocking drugs that altered the biological course of the affected minors, treatment rarely described in detail in the corporate media but simply herded under the banner "gender-affirming care."
 
The Sixth Circuit had found the statute constitutional and teh Supreme Court, by a vote of six to three and via an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, found the law at issue did not violate the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The majority found that such a law did not require the sort of strict scrutiny analysis which is often, but not always, applied to laws that are said to discriminate against persons on the basis of race and sex.  Such a strict scrutiny analysis is crucial because governmental distinctions between citizens that are subject to this standard are "inherently suspect."
 
Rather, the Tennessee law merely had to meet the rational basis test to pass equal protection muster, meaning the statute was constitutional as long as the legislature had a rational, even if arguably incorrect, basis for enacting the law.
 
Justice Thomas' concurs and notes that regulation of medical procedures routinely and properly distinguishes between the sexes
 
Justice Thomas aptly pointed out that the Fourteenth Amendment uses much different language from that of anti-discrimination laws such as Title VI, this amendment stating simply, "no  State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Justice Thomas further explained that courts have held that discrimination based upon "sexual orientation" is not equivalent to that based upon "sex" itself.  However, even if one were to accept such analysis, this would not apply in the context of equal protection analysis given that, as noted above, the language in anti-discrimination statutes is different from that in the 14th Amendment.
 
Justice Thomas thus wrote that a finding that medical laws that supposedly "discriminate" against treatment for transgender minors is subject to "strict scrutiny" because such constitutes discrimination based upon "sex," would call into question much of our regulation of medical procedures, which does in fact distinguish among biological sexess:

Applying. . . such reasoning to the Equal Protection Clause would also invite sweeping consequences. Many statutes “regulate medical procedures defined by sex.” L. W. v. Skrmetti, 83 F. 4th 460, 482 (CA6 2023) (collecting examples, including laws referencing testicular and prostate cancer). If heightened scrutiny applied to such laws, then “[a]ny person with standing to challenge” such a decision could “haul the State into federal court and compel it to establish by evidence (presumably in the form of expert testimony) that there is an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for the classification.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 597 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Given the ensuing potential for “high-cost, high-risk lawsuit[s],” ibid., States might simply decline to adopt or enforce sex-based medical laws or regulations, even where such rules would be best medical practice. The burden of skeptical judicial review is therefore far from the “modest step” of requiring a State to “show its work” that the dissent posits. Post, at 31 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). (Skrmetti, J. Thomas concurring opinion, pp. 4-5; footnote omitted.)

 

In summary, the state law at issue more than survives the "rational basis" test, according to Justice Thomas.  Echoing the majority opinion, Thomas wrote that not only is there no clear medical consensus on "gender-affirming treatment" for minors, but he went into detail regarding what this "medical treatment" entails, noting that it includes the excision of the breasts of minors too young to legally consent to such a procedure.

 

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Happy Birthday to the United States Army

 

 

This weekend, on June 14th — Flag Day —  we celebrated the 250th anniversary of the United States Army.  The Wood family enjoyed watching the military parade in Washington, D.C. and were so proud of all those who participated and thought it was a fitting tribute to our army.  For 250 years, we have had these brave men and women serve in our armed forces and support the Rule of Law, Democracy, and Freedom.  

Those who have served since June 14, 1775, are quite a contrast to those today who are of another ideological persuasion who choose to assault, insult, hector, threaten, and impede our brave men and women of law enforcement. 

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Ames v. Dept of Youth Services - Plaintiffs who are white and heterosexual should not automatically have their claims disfavored

The “heightened burden” rule made up the Federal courts is “atextual”

The Supreme Court has made clear the obvious:  that all plaintiffs making similar claims for discrimination must meet the same burden of proof.  While this may seem obvious to anyone who knows the guarantees of liberty and equality found in our Constitution, Federal courts have held that certain plaintiffs, such as white people or straight women, are disfavored and must meet an almost impossible standard so as to, of course, discourage their pesky claims.  It has taken a unanimous United States Supreme Court via a well-written opinion by the Hon. Ketanji Brown Jackson to disabuse these courts of this notion. (Ames v. Dept. of Youth Services (June 5, 2025) 23-1039.). This means that even Justices Sotomayor and Kagan voted to treat all Americans equally in terms of their claims of discrimination — even if they are straight and/or white.

The Supreme Court summarized the underlying claim of discrimination succinctly:

The Ohio Department of Youth Services operates the State’s juvenile correctional system. In 2004, the agency hired petitioner Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, to serve as an executive secretary. Ames was eventually promoted to program administrator and, in 2019, applied for a newly created management position in the agency’s Office of Quality and Improvement. Although the agency interviewed her for the position, it ultimately hired a different candidate—a lesbian woman—to fill the role.

A few days after Ames interviewed for the management position, her supervisors removed her from her role as program administrator. She accepted a demotion to the secretarial role she had held when she first joined the agency— a move that resulted in a significant pay cut. The agency then hired a gay man to fill the vacant program-administrator position. Ames subsequently filed this lawsuit against the agency under Title VII, alleging that she was denied the management promotion and demoted because of her sexual orientation.

The District Court found this poor woman had to meet a very high burden, a heightened burden designed to stack the deck against her, and granted the department summary judgment.  Somehow, the Sixth District, and other districts had either created or perpetuated this heightened burden, as the Ames opinion explained:

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Like the District Court, the Sixth Circuit held that Ames had failed to meet her primafacie burden because she had not shown “‘background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.’” 87 F. 4th, at 825. The court reasoned that Ames, as a straight woman, was required to make this showing “in addition to the usual ones for establishing a prima-facie case.” Ibid. And it explained that plaintiffs can typically satisfy this burden, where applicable, by presenting “evidence that a member of the relevant minority group (here, gay people) made the employment decision at issue, or with statistical evidence showing a pattern of discrimination . . . against members of the majority group.” Ibid. The panel concluded that the agency was entitled to summary judgment because Ames had failed to present either type of evidence. Ibid.

But, as Justice Brown explained, each individual American who is a plaintiff must - wait for it — be treated “equally:”

By establishing the same protections for every “individual”— without regard to that individual’s membership in a minority or majority group — Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.
. . .
Our case law thus makes clear that the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group. Accord, Bostock, 590 U. S., at 659 (“This statute works to protect individuals of both sexes from discrimination, and does so equally”). The “background circum stances” rule flouts that basic principle.

The concurrence of Justice Clarence B. Thomas  noted that the heightened evidence rule had been entirely made up, i.e., was “atextual,” having been created by the Courts and was not found in the language used by Congress:

I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to highlight the problems that arise when judges create atextual legal rules and frameworks. Judge-made doctrines have a tendency to distort the underlying statutory text, impose unnecessary burdens on litigants, and cause confusion for courts. The “background circumstances” rule—correctly rejected by the Court today—is one example of this phenomenon.

 

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Secretary Hegsworth: "We produce such men still, from far flung places willing to traverse the entire globe to defend freedom”

D-Day Anniversary 2025

Today we commemorate the 71st Anniversary of the Invasion of Normandy — not by the forces of “neutral” or “pacifist” nations — but by Allied forces from democracies who believe in fighting evil.  Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth spoke the following remarks at today's commemoration, making the apt comparison between our soldiers today to those who served then, stating that we “produce such men still, from far flung places willing to traverse the entire globe to defend freedom.”

Given that I like to highlight excellence in argumentation and speech, here are his remarks:

As I stare at that flag, we are forever grateful to the French government for dedicating this land as a resting place for our men. It's also an awe-inspiring sight to see the American flag flying here above thousands of crosses and stars as a tribute to our very best. As the former superintendent of this cemetery used to say, there they are. Still serving their country. A living reminder.

Eighty-one years ago, Hitler thought his Atlantic Wall was impenetrable, many agreed. He clearly had not met enough Americans. A more daring assault had never been planned. The task was daunting, a frontal assault across the channel on beaches and cliffs, strewn with obstacles and defended by heavily fortified bunkers.

 

Our only advantage was that the enemy underestimated the strength of the Allied war cause. The invasion would include brave troops from the U.S., Great Britain, Canada, France, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Belgium, Norway, Poland, Greece, and Holland. On the ground, the French Resistance covertly aided the effort.
And as the troops loaded into their ships, planes, and landing craft, they received copies of an order from General Eisenhower reminding them of the stakes of their mission. I have a copy right here. 

 

He wrote, "You are about to embark upon the great crusade toward which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty loving people everywhere march with you. 

 

"In company with our brave allies and brothers in arms on other fronts, you will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over the oppressed peoples of Europe and security for ourselves in a free world. Your task will not be an easy one." 

 

He ends by writing, "And let us all beseech the blessings of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking." 
Now that's a mission statement if I've ever heard one. Those words along with ceaseless prayers to the Lord Almighty willed our troops as they pushed off into dark and choppy waters.

 

They prayed. They smoked. They joked. They wrote home. They looked at photos. They knew many of them would not make it out alive and they would have to rely on each other to succeed or to just survive.

 

 
The assault began quietly before dawn on June the 6th with radio silence as paratroopers and gliders landed in the early hours. These men flung themselves into the abyss of night lit only by the fire of German tracers. 

 

Later that morning, the greatest amphibious assault in the history of mankind began in full force. Our men pushed through the waves and flung themselves upon the sand. The courage it took to do this is unfathomable.

 

The first groups were decimated. Thousands of young men lost their lives, cut down by the barrage of machine guns and mortars. But they never let up. Our warriors never faltered, God at their backs. As they forced their way inland, the Atlantic Wall began to crumble. It is these men and their bravery whom we are here to celebrate and remember.

 

A generation of farmhands and city kids. Baseball players and shopkeepers. Big towns, small towns, rich, poor, who were forged and hardened in the Great Depression. Hard men, forged for hard times. Ordinary men, who mustered extraordinary courage. While every one of the 9,000 Americans buried here are heroes, three men here also received the Medal of Honor for their actions in the invasion.

 

And as Sebastian mentioned, one of those was Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt Jr., the oldest man to land on D-Day at the age of 56. He had to submit a written petition to receive permission because he had a heart condition and arthritis. He had nothing to prove, but he could not stay back while his men met their fate.

 

There were no other generals on the beach that day. When he landed far from his objective, he simply said men will start the war from right here. He organized the troops and made order out of chaos. A month later, his heart gave out, but he had completed his mission, as did every soul buried under one of those markers.
You see, war reveals the true character of men. The character of a people. Lead from the front or capitulate and fall out. To walk over or run if you can, carrying equipment over that open beach as shells and bullets thunder around you again and again, I cannot imagine. Could you do that? Could I? Could we? As we know, we have a number of these warriors with us here today.

These men, boys then, were part of those landing forces. They embody the warrior ethos. We have many other men here today who served in France, and across the world in that war. To that, I can simply say, gentlemen, thank you for your service, for your sacrifice and for your bravery. That day and those days that followed turned the tide of the war and history itself.

 

In the two months after the invasion, the Allies poured more than two million troops through the hard-won opening in Normandy without Operation Overlord, without the sacrifices of American, French, British and other Allied powers, we would not have the free world. This day, June the 6th, is the price of freedom.

We remember the losses. We celebrate the victories. We rededicate ourselves to the fight for liberty, security, and peace. And again, we should ask ourselves, could I do what they did? Could you? Could we? Could our kids? Do we produce such men? How do we produce such Americans? Our civilization today and going forward must answer those questions.

 

You know, I wrote this speech before this morning, but this morning I got my answer. This morning, I had a chance to do PT with Army Rangers on the beach, on Omaha Beach, I got my answer to those questions. With the sun rising with the Ranger regiment, yes, we do produce such men still, from far flung places willing to traverse the entire globe to defend freedom.

I had a chance this morning to run with a young ranger whose grandfather was liberated in the Philippines by the sixth Rangers. He joined and he didn't even know that. The legacy of Americans around the world for freedom. As we ran on that beach this morning at 6:30, as the sun was rising about the same time those first landing crafts landed, didn't look much like a battlefield.

 

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Using ChatGPT to create your resume - a stunning example

 

 

ChatGPT can create an eerily accurate and personal resume from publicly available data

 

I recently asked ChatGPT to create my resume, but only using information available to anyone.  Meaning that I gave ChatGPT no information whatsoever about myself, and merely asked it to find what information it could find from other sources, and then make a resume for myself.

 

The resume created was eerily accurate, with my only quibble being that it used adjectives such as " accomplished" that I prefer to leave out.  Here is the nearly-instantaneous result:

Based on publicly available information, here is a professional résumé for attorney Paul Kevin Wood:

⸻

Paul Kevin Wood, Esq.

Contact Information:
    •    Address: [omitted here]
    •    LinkedIn: linkedin.com/in/paulkevinwood

⸻

Professional Summary

Paul Kevin Wood is a seasoned appellate attorney with over three decades of experience in civil litigation, appellate law, and legal education. Certified by the State Bar of California as an Appellate Law Specialist, he has led law and motion departments and served as a legal education director. His career includes extensive work in appellate advocacy, legal research, and litigation strategy. He is also an accomplished author and legal commentator.

⸻

Bar Admissions
    •    California (License No. 151004) – Active since 1990  

⸻

Certifications
    •    Certified Specialist in Appellate Law – State Bar of California  

⸻

Education
    •    Juris Doctor (J.D.) – University of Southern California Gould School of Law
    •    Bachelor’s Degree – Pepperdine University

⸻

Professional Experience
    •    Appellate and Law and Motion Attorney
    •    Over 31 years of experience in appellate practice and civil litigation.
    •    Led the Law and Motion/Appellate department and served as Legal Education Director at a major corporation.  

⸻

Publications & Commentary
    •    Author: Kinetic Blue – A coming-of-age novel set in 1980s Southern California.
    •    Legal Blog: The Appellate Spectator – Provides insights on appellate decisions and legal analysis.   

⸻

Personal
    •    Resides in Palm Beach County, Florida, with his husband and their three children. 

 

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Question: When is humor ever appropriate in terms of oral or written argument?

"Blonde Ambition:" the proper use of satire towards the ridiculous use of language

 

 

I often get asked if there is any place for humor in a legal brief or at oral argument, and the answer, of course, is virtually never, no matter how ridiculous opposing counsel or the other party may be in terms of their affect or positions.  Ergo, humor – especially when aimed at a particular person or a group of persons – is rarely appropriate.

But I would say the one exception would be mild humor directed, not at any person or entity, but at disingenuous phrasing or more specifically use of a misnomer by opposing  counsel, such as calling a baby a  "fetus" to divert attention from its personhood or a person convicted of a violent felony a “person involved in the criminal justice system."
 

For example, the recent “space flight“ of the “astronauts“ on the Virgin Galactic spacecraft involving Katy Perry, Gayle King, etc., is of course ripe for satire.  This is especially true in terms of the insistence of some in describing these publicity-seeking space tourists in the same terms as astronauts on the actual Space Shuttle or ISS. Indeed, National Public Radio recently called this brief trip “historic,” as if Jeff Bezos’ girlfriend's space tourism ride should be mentioned in the same breath as Valentina Tereshkova or Sally Ride or even Ham, the first Chimpanzee in space, who beat Bezos' girlfriend by about 64 years. (See https://www.npr.org/2025/04/14/nx-s1-5364460/blue-origin-launch-female-space-flight-katy-perry.}


This is perhaps best illustrated by one of the funniest and most enjoyable satirical videos I have ever watched, namely, Megyn Kelly’s video “Blonde Origin” in which she and two other women visit a facility where they enjoy the sensation of weightlessness, and afterward, insist that they in fact, went on a "space flight” as "astronauts.” 

 

So here, then, is a good example of humor aimed at exaggerated language, with one celebrity woman making fun of the pretension of other celebrity women:

 

 

(See https://www.megynkelly.com/2025/05/02/watch-megyn-kelly-blonde-origin-parody-with-mk-media-team/.) 

 

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Study - Near Death Experiences Often Profoundly Change Views of Work So Much That 75% Switch Careers

 

Near-death experiences alter views of work towards valuing relationships and meaning over pure productivity

 

A retrospective study finds that 75% of those who have had a "near death" experience are so profoundly changed that they switch careers.  See the article at StudyFinds.org:

 

https://studyfinds.org/near-death-experiences-how-people-view-their-jobs/

As the linked article states:

 

The study identified six major themes characterizing how NDEs affect work lives: (1) insights and new realizations, such as believing in continued consciousness after death and seeing a universal connection among all people; (2) personal transformations, including increased confidence, spirituality, and sometimes perceived unusual abilities; (3) reprioritization of work, with reduced importance placed on material success and greater emphasis on meaning and personal fulfillment; (4) job changes, with 75% of participants switching careers after their NDE; (5) changes in motivation, with participants losing interest in traditional work goals while becoming highly motivated by work aligned with their newfound values; and (6) transformed relationships with colleagues, clients, and customers, characterized by greater empathy and viewing business transactions as relationship opportunities rather than merely financial exchanges.

Food for thought the next time a Court is rude or hostile during oral argument.

 

For the records, I have never had a "near death" experience.  I did, however, have a "near life" experience, as I call it, in that we took an entire month off work to complete a home exchange in the Netherlands and also visit Israel and Jordan. I therefore highly recommend finding a way to take at least one long break during your career:  it gives a glimpse as to how life would be without professional deadlines and pressures.

 

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Update: Text of Order that the United States "return" a Foreign National from His Country of Citizenship

 

 

Text of Trial Judge's Order that the United States "return" a Foreign National from His Country

In a prior post we discussed the Fourth District Opinion lecturing the Executive Branch about the supposed "dangers" of taking the position the Judicial Branch did not have jurisdiction to do what it has done, namely order that El Salvadorean national be "returned" from El Salvador to the United States.  The conceit, if you will, is that even though the Judicial Branch has no jurisdiction over El Salvador (and, of course, little jurisdiction over the foreign policy of the Executive Branch) it has jurisdiction over Garcia because he resided in the United States before his deportation.  Ergo, the Judicial Branch now believes it has jurisdiction to order specific communications between the Executive Branch and another government, i.e., that the Executive Branch engage in communications between itself and the El Salvadorean government to return this "American" to the United States of America.  

Indeed, without any input from El Salvador, the trial court has, in its own words, decided that El Salvador has no "interest" in deciding where its own citizen is kept. Indeed, Judge Innis calls her order of unimaginable breadth in terms of jurisdiction a "narrow" remedy. (For the exact language used, see italicized language in the order below.)

Of course, this order by the trial court which has been upheld by the Fourth Circuit has been described by corporate media without much real discussion of the order's actual language.  The order itself can, however, be found at:  https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-dis-crt-d-mar/117127616.html

Therefore, today we look at the actual order of Judge Xinis, which finds the court has jurisdiction over the efforts of the United States government in regards to Mr. Garcia, and, in particular, the implied premises that it has the authority to order the Executive Branch to undertake communications with a foreign government designed to do what the trial court has ordered.  While it is tempting to say that Messrs. Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton could not have ever foreseen such a broad expansion of judicial power, we will let the opinion speak for itself.  The entire opinion is quoted below, without a single ellipse.  

 

The only modifications are italics for emphasis provided by your author and noted as "emphasis added for this article:"

 

ABREGO GARCIA v. NOEM (2025)

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Kilmar Armando ABREGO GARCIA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Kristi NOEM, Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 8:25-cv-00951-PX

Decided: April 06, 2025

Andrew J. Rossman, Pro Hac Vice, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, New York, NY, Jonathan Gordon Cooper, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Washington, DC, Rina Mahesh Gandhi, Simon Y. Sandoval-Moshenberg, Murray Osorio PLLC, Fairfax, VA, for Plaintiffs. Tarra DeShields Minnis, DOJ-United States Attorney's Office, Baltimore, MD, Erez Reuveni, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In 2019, an immigration judge—acting under the authority delegated by the United States Attorney General and pursuant to powers vested by Congress—granted Plaintiff Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia (“Abrego Garcia”) withholding of removal, thereby protecting him from return to his native country, El Salvador. ECF No. 1 ¶ 41; ECF No. 1-1. Such protection bars the United States from sending a noncitizen to a country where, more likely than not, he would face persecution that risks his “life or freedom.” See Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–.18 & .24 (setting forth the standard for withholding of removal and the procedures required for its termination).

Six years later, without notice, legal justification, or due process, officers from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), a subagency of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), put him on a plane bound for the Terrorism Confinement Center (“CECOT”) in El Salvador. ECF No. 1¶ 59.¹ Neither the United States nor El Salvador have told anyone why he was returned to the very country to which he cannot return, or why he is detained at CECOT.² See Hr'g Tr., Apr. 4, 2025, 25: 13–14 (Mr. Reuveni: “We have nothing to say on the merits. We concede he should not have been removed to El Salvador.”); see Hr'g Tr., Apr. 4, 2025, 34:25–35:5 (The Court: “[W]hat basis is he held? Why is he [in CECOT] of all places?” ․ Mr. Reuveni: “I don't know. That information has not been given to me. I don't know.”).

That silence is telling. As Defendants acknowledge, they had no legal authority to arrest him, no justification to detain him, and no grounds to send him to El Salvador ³ —let alone deliver him into one of the most dangerous prisons in the Western Hemisphere.⁴ Having confessed grievous error, the Defendants now argue that this Court lacks the power to hear this case, and they lack the power to order Abrego Garcia's return. ECF No. 11 at 3. For the following reasons, their jurisdictional arguments fail as a matter of law. Further, to avoid clear irreparable harm, and because equity and justice compels it, the Court grants the narrowest, daresay only, relief warranted: to order that Defendants return Abrego Garcia to the United States. (Emphasis added for this article.).

I. Background

Abrego Garcia was born and raised in Los Nogales, El Salvador. ECF No. 1-1 at 2. His family owned a small and successful pupuseria. Id. For years, they were subject to extortion and threats of death by one of El Salvador's most notorious gangs, Barrio 18. Id. at 2. The gang used Abrego Garcia as a pawn in its extortion, demanding that his mother give Abrego Garcia over to the gang or he and others in their family would be killed. Id. at 3. Attempting to escape the gang's reach, the family moved three times without success. Id. To protect Abrego Garcia, they ultimately sent him to the United States to live with his older brother, a U.S. citizen, in Maryland. ECF No. 1 ¶ 22.

Abrego Garcia lived in Maryland for many years without lawful status. Id. In early 2019, while waiting at the Home Depot in Hyattsville, Maryland, to be hired as a day laborer, Abrego Garcia was arrested. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. The Prince George's County Police Department questioned him about gang affiliation, but nothing came of it. Id. ¶ 27. He was then turned over to ICE custody. Id. ¶ 28.

On March 29, 2019, DHS initiated removal proceedings against Abrego Garcia pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). ECF No. 1 ¶ 29. On April 24, 2019, Abrego Garcia appeared before an immigration judge (“IJ”) where he conceded his deportability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. ECF No. 1-1.

Pending resolution of the requested relief, DHS argued for Abrego Garcia to be detained in ICE custody. ECF No. 1 ¶ 30. DHS relied principally on a singular unsubstantiated allegation that Abrego Garcia was a member of MS-13.⁵ The IJ ultimately detained Abrego Garcia pending the outcome of his requested relief from deportation, a decision affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals. ECF Nos. 11-1 & 11-2.

October 10, 2019, following a full evidentiary hearing, the IJ granted Abrego Garcia withholding of removal to El Salvador pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). As a matter of law, withholding of removal prohibits DHS from returning an alien to the specific country in which he faces clear probability of persecution. In Abrego Garcia's case, the IJ concluded that he was entitled to such protection because the Barrio 18 gang had been “targeting him and threatening him with death because of his family's pupusa business.” ECF No. 1-1 at 2. DHS never appealed the grant of withholding of removal, and so the decision became final on November 9, 2019.⁶ See Hr'g Tr., Apr. 4, 2025, 24:15–16 (Mr. Reuveni: “The government did not appeal that decision, so it is final.”). Accordingly, as Defendants have repeatedly admitted, they were legally prohibited from deporting Abrego Garcia to El Salvador. See Hr'g Tr., Apr. 4, 2025, 25:6–7 (Mr. Reuveni: “There's no dispute that the order could not be used to send Mr. Abrego Garcia to El Salvador.”).

For the next six years, Abrego Garcia lived in Maryland with his wife and their three children. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 24–25. He complied fully with all directives from ICE, including annual check-ins, and has never been charged with or convicted of any crime. ECF No. 1-3, ECF No. 1 ¶ 45.

On March 12, 2025, while driving home from work with his young son in the car, Abrego Garcia was stopped by ICE agents. Id. ¶¶ 48–49. The officers had no warrant for his arrest and no lawful basis to take him into custody; they told him only that his “status had changed.” Id. ¶ 50. He was first transported to an ICE facility in Baltimore, Maryland. Id. ¶¶ 51–53. Next, ICE agents shuttled him to detention facilities in Louisiana and La Villa, Texas. Id. ¶¶ 54–57. He was allowed a handful of calls to his wife. He said that he was told he would see a judge soon. Id. But that never happened.

Three days later, on March 15, 2025, without any notice, legal process, or hearing, ICE forcibly transported Abrego Garcia to the Terrorism Confinement Center (“CECOT”) in El Salvador, a notorious supermax prison known for widespread human rights violations. ECF No. 1 ¶ 59; ECF No. 11-3 at 2; ECF No. 10-2. On that day, two planes carried over 100 aliens to CECOT purportedly pursuant to the Alien Enemies Act, ECF No. 11-3 at 2, the legality of which is the subject of separate litigation. See J.G.G. v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-766 (JEB), 2025 WL 890401 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2025). A third plane included “aliens with Title 8 removal orders;” many of them were in ICE custody awaiting asylum and other protective hearings in the United States. ECF No. 11-3 at 2; see J.G.G. v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-766 (JEB), ECF Nos. 67-5–67-20.

Once the planes arrived in El Salvador, the male detainees ⁷ were stripped and shackled. Their heads were shaved, and they were marched into CECOT to join nearly 40,000 other prisoners held in some of the most inhumane and squalid conditions known in any carceral system. ECF No. 10-3. Since then, no one has heard from Abrego Garcia. ECF No. 1 ¶ 41.

To effectuate a mass relocation of those detained by the United States, the federal government struck an agreement with El Salvador whereby it would pay the Salvadoran government six-million dollars for placement of the detainees in “very good jails at a fair price that will also save our taxpayer dollars.” Marco Rubio (@SecRubio), X (Mar. 16, 2025, 7:59 AM), https://x.com/SecRubio/status/1901241933302825470. El Salvador's President, Nayib Bukele, has publicly touted the agreement terms: “We are willing to take in only convicted criminals (including convicted U.S. citizens) into our mega-prison (CECOT) in exchange for a fee.”⁸ ECF No. 10-5; Nayib Bukele (@nayibbukele), X (Apr. 4, 2025, 10:23 AM), https://x.com/nayibbukele/status/1901245427216978290. According to a memorandum issued by El Salvador's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the agreement provides that the detainees will be held “for one (1) year, pending the United States’ decision on [their] long term disposition.” See Matthew Lee & Regina Garcia Cano, Trump Officials Secretly Deported Venezuelans and Salvadorans to a Notorious Prison in El Salvador, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 15, 2025), https://apnews.com/article/trump-deportations-salvador-tren-aragua-64e72142a171ea57c869c3b35eeecce7.

After Abrego Garcia was transferred to CECOT, Defendant, DHS Secretary, Kristi Noem, personally toured the facility alongside senior Salvadoran officials. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Inside the Action: Secretary Noem's Visit to El Salvador, DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/medialibrary/assets/video/59108 (last visited Apr. 4, 2025). From inside the prison walls, Secretary Noem declared that transferring individuals previously detained on U.S. soil to CECOT remains “one of the tools in our [the United States’] toolkit that we will use if you commit crimes against the American people.” U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., How It's Going, DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/medialibrary/assets/video/59108 (last visited Apr. 4, 2025) (emphasis added).

Although the legal basis for the mass removal of hundreds of individuals to El Salvador remains disturbingly unclear, Abrego Garcia's case is categorically different—there were no legal grounds whatsoever for his arrest, detention, or removal. Nor does any evidence suggest that Abrego Garcia is being held in CECOT at the behest of Salvadoran authorities to answer for crimes in that country. Rather, his detention appears wholly lawless.

Based on these events, Abrego Garcia, through counsel, and along with his wife, Jennifer Stefania Vasquez Sura, and their son, A.A.V., by and through his mother and next friend,⁹ filed suit in this Court on March 24, 2025, against DHS Secretary Noem; Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Todd Lyons; Acting Executive Associate Director of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations, Kenneth Genalo; ICE Baltimore Field Office Director, Nikita Baker; Attorney General, Pamela Bondi; and Secretary of State, Marco Rubio (collectively “Defendants”). Abrego Garcia specifically alleges that his removal to El Salvador violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)(Count I); the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (Count II); and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (Count III); and, pleaded in the alternative, qualifies him for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Count V). ECF No. 1. The matter is now before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, ECF No. 6, following full briefing and a hearing held on April 4, 2025. This Memorandum Opinion sets forth the Court's findings in support of the Order entered on April 4, 2025.

II. Jurisdictional Challenges

The Defendants’ only meaningful challenge to the motion is that this Court lacks the power to hear this case. They advance three arguments. The Court considers each in turn.

A. The Court lacks Jurisdiction Because the “Core” of the Claims Sound in Habeas

Defendants first argue that because Abrego Garcia challenges his confinement in CECOT, the “core” of his claims sound only in habeas brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq. ECF No. 11 at 7, citing DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 117 (2020) (“habeas ․ is the appropriate remedy to ascertain ․ whether any person is rightfully in confinement or not.”). And as such, suit is proper only against the immediate “custodian” (the Warden of CECOT) and in the jurisdiction where Abrego Garcia is confined (El Salvador). Id. at 9.

Defendants are wrong on several fronts. Abrego Garcia exclusively challenges his lawless return to El Salvador, not the fact of his confinement. ECF No. 1 at 16-20. This is the core of his claim, as Defendants concede, which is why his suit would remain equally strong had Defendants released Abrego Garcia to the streets of El Salvador instead of CECOT. Hr'g. Tr., Apr. 4, 2025, at 19. As Defendants did in J.G.G. v. Trump, Civil Action No. 25-766 (JEB), 2025 WL 890401, at *7–8 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2025), they fundamentally ignore the difference between challenging legality of removal as opposed to confinement. Id.¹⁰ For purposes of this decision, however, Abrego Garcia simply does not challenge his confinement. The removal itself lies at the heart of the wrongs. Thus, the Court need not wade into the murky jurisdictional implications that flow from such a challenge.

But even if the Court considers the thorny question of “custody” as it pertains to Abrego Garcia's habeas claim (Count V), the Defendants are not out of the woods. They do indeed cling to the stunning proposition that they can forcibly remove any person—migrant and U.S. citizen alike —to prisons outside the United States, and then baldly assert they have no way to effectuate return because they are no longer the “custodian,” and the Court thus lacks jurisdiction. As a practical matter, the facts say otherwise.

The facts are that the United States exerts control over each of the nearly 200 migrants sent to CECOT. The Defendants detained them, transported them by plane, and paid for their placement in the mega-jail until “the United States” decides “their long-term disposition.”¹¹ Against this backdrop, Defendants have produced no evidence to suggest they cannot secure one such detainee, Abrego Garcia, for return to the United States. (Emphasis added for this article.). Equally important, to credit Defendants’ argument would permit the unfettered relinquishment of any person regardless of immigration status or citizenship to foreign prisons “for pennies on the dollar.”¹²

Nor do the Defendants cite any authority to support this eye-popping proposition. Sure, they point the Court to Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), but that decision has little bearing here. In Munaf, the Court reviewed whether plaintiffs, American citizens who voluntarily traveled to Iraq and were subsequently detained for violations of Iraqi law, could challenge their detention. The Court concluded that while the district court retained jurisdiction in the first instance, id. 686, the merits of the habeas challenge failed because “Iraq has the sovereign right to prosecute Omar and Munaf for crimes committed on its soil.” Id. at 695 (emphasis added).

Here, by contrast, Abrego Garcia is not being held for crimes committed in or against El Salvador, the United States, or anywhere else for that matter. His claims do not implicate any question of competing sovereign interests, and so, Munaf offers little guidance.¹³ (Emphasis added for this article.). Thus, while the success of Abrego Garcia's preliminary injunction motion does not depend on the success of his habeas claim, Defendants also fail to convince this Court that the claim will not survive in the end. For purposes of this decision, suffice to say the Court retains jurisdiction because Abrego Garcia challenges his removal to El Salvador, not the fact of confinement.

B. Redressability

Defendants next make a narrow standing argument, contending that because the claims are not redressable, this Court lacks the power to hear the case. ECF No. 11 at 10. Federal courts are ones of limited jurisdiction, hearing only live “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. A party's standing to maintain an action “is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm., 554 U.S. 724, 733 (2008) (citations omitted). To satisfy Article III standing, the plaintiff must make plausible that he “(1)[ ] has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000).

The Defendants’ redressability argument, simply put, is that their placement of Abrego Garcia in an El Salvadoran prison deprives them of any power to return him. Thus, they say, even if Abrego Garcia succeeds on the merits, Defendants are powerless to get him back. The facts demonstrate otherwise.

First, Defendants can and do return wrongfully removed migrants as a matter of course. This is why in Lopez-Sorto v. Garland, 103 F.4th 242, 248–53 (4th Cir. 2024), the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Defendants could redress wrongful removal to El Salvador by facilitating the plaintiff's return per DHS’ own directives. Id. at 253; see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 436 (2009) (“Aliens who are removed may continue to pursue their petitions for review, and those that prevail can be afforded effective relief by facilitation of their return, along with restoration of the immigration status they had upon removal.”).

Second, Defendants unilaterally placed hundreds of detainees behind the walls of CECOT without ceding control over the detainees’ fates, as the detainees are in CECOT “pending the United States’ decision on their long-term disposition.” See Matthew Lee & Regina Garcia Cano, Trump Officials Secretly Deported Venezuelans and Salvadorans to a Notorious Prison in El Salvador, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 15, 2025), https://apnews.com/article/trump-deportations-salvador-tren-aragua-64e72142a171ea57c869c3b35eeecce7. Unlike Abrego Garcia, for whom no reason exists to detain him, Defendants transported many individuals who had been detained in the United States while awaiting immigration proceedings.¹⁴ Yet, despite Defendants’ power to transfer those awaiting hearings to CECOT for a “good price,” Defendants disclaim any ability to secure their return, including Abrego Garcia. ECF No. 11 at 11. Surely, Defendants do not mean to suggest that they have wholesale erased the substantive and procedural protections of the INA in one fell swoop by dropping those individuals in CECOT without recourse. Instead, the record reflects that Defendants have “outsource[d] part of the [United States’] prison system.”¹⁵ See also U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., How It's Going, DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/medialibrary/assets/video/59108 (last visited Apr. 4, 2025) (quoting Defendant Noem: “This facility is one of the tools in our toolkit that we will use”).”¹⁶ Thus, just as in any other contract facility, Defendants can and do maintain the power to secure and transport their detainees, Abrego Garcia included.

In the end, Defendants’ redressability argument rings hollow. As their counsel suggested at the hearing, this is not about Defendants’ inability to return Abrego Garcia, but their lack of desire.

THE COURT: Can we talk about, then, just very practically, why can't the United States get Mr. Abrego Garcia back?

MR. REUVENI: Your Honor, I will say, for the Court's awareness, that when this case landed on my desk, the first thing I did was ask my clients that very question. I've not received, to date, an answer that I find satisfactory.

Hr'g Tr., Apr. 4, 2025, at 35–36. See also id. at 50 (counsel seeking 24 hours to persuade Defendants to secure Abrego Garcia's return). Flat refusal, however, does not negate redressability. The record reflects that the remedy is available. Abrego Garcia maintains standing to sue.

C. Section 1252(g) of the INA Does Not Strip the Court's Jurisdiction in this Case

Lastly, Defendants argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (“Section 1252(g)”) deprives the Court of jurisdiction to review this matter. The statute reads:

Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or non-statutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

Defendants concede that Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), commands a narrow construction of Section 1252(g), limiting application solely to the Attorney General's exercise of lawful discretion to (1) commence proceedings; (2) adjudicate cases; or (3) execute removal orders. Id. (“It is implausible that the mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings.”). See also Bowrin v. U.S. I.N.S., 194 F.3d 483, 488 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that Section 1252(g) only stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to review the “Attorney General's decision to exercise her discretion to initiate or prosecute the specific stages in the deportation process.”). As the Reno Court explained, “there was good reason for Congress to focus special attention upon, and make special provision for, judicial review of the Attorney General's discrete acts ․ which represent the initiation or prosecution of various stages in the deportation process.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, this Court is deprived of jurisdiction only for the discretionary decisions made concerning the three stages of the deportation process. See Bowrin v. U.S. INS, 194 F.3d 483, 488 (4th Cir. 1999); U.S. v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2004); Coyotl v. Kelly, 261 F. Supp. 3d 1328, 1339–1341 (N.D. Ga. 2017); Gondal v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 343 F. Supp. 3d 83, 92 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). But see Silva v. United States, 866 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2017).

Defendants press that Section 1252(g) precludes jurisdiction here because the claims concern Defendants’ “execution of his removal order.” ECF No. 11 at 13. The argument fails in both fact and law.

First, the Court cannot credit that Defendants removed Abrego Garcia pursuant to an “executed removal order” under the INA. Defendants have not produced any order of removal as to Abrego Garcia, executed or otherwise, or submitted any proof that they had removed him pursuant to one. Hr'g Tr. Apr. 4, 2025, at 20 (counsel admitting no order of removal is part of the record); see also id. at 22 (counsel confirming that “the removal order” from 2019 “cannot be executed” and is not part of the record). Nor have any other corollary documents surfaced, such as a “warrant for removal/deportation” customarily served on an alien as part of a lawful deportation or removal. Id.¹⁷ From this, the Court cannot conclude that Abrego Garcia was spirited to CECOT on an “executed removal order” such that Section 1252(g) is implicated.

Second, even if there were an executed order of removal for Abrego Garcia, his claims do not seek review of any discretionary decisions. He is not asking this Court to review the wisdom of the Attorney General's lawful exercise of authority. Rather, he asks that the Court determine whether his return to El Salvador violated the INA. In this circumstance, the Fourth Circuit has spoken.

Bowrin v. U.S. INS, 194 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 1999) made plain that review of agency decisions involving pure questions of law “do not fall into any of the three categories enumerated in § 1252(g).” Bowrin, 194 F.3d at 488. Section 1252(g), the Bowrin Court emphasized, “does not apply to all claims arising from deportation proceedings, because § 1252(g) stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction only to review challenges to the Attorney General's decision to exercise her discretion to initiate or prosecute these specific stages in the deportation process.” Id. (citing American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. at 482) (emphasis added). See also Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1155 (“The district court may consider a purely legal question that does not challenge the Attorney General's discretionary authority, even if the answer to that legal question ․ forms the backdrop against which the Attorney General later will exercise discretionary authority.”); Siahaan v. Madrigal, Civil No. PWG-20-02618, 2020 WL 5893638, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 5, 2020) (“To insist, as the Respondents do, that this Court lacks jurisdiction because of § 1252(g) to determine the purely legal questions of whether his removal under these circumstances violates the statutory and constitutional provisions that his habeas petition has raised runs contrary to the consistent rulings of the Supreme Court for at least twenty years.”); Coyotl, 261 F. Supp. 3d at 1339–41. Accordingly, and after exhaustive analysis, Bowrin concluded that “absent express congressional intent ․ to eliminate the general federal habeas corpus review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241, the remedy remains available to Bowrin and other aliens similarly situated.” Bowrin, 194 F.3d at 489 (collecting cases).

Like Bowrin, Abrego Garcia presents to this Court a pure question of law: whether Defendants exceeded their authority in returning him to El Salvador, in violation of the 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Hr'g Tr., Apr. 4, 2025, at 24. In this Court's view, no plainer question of statutory interpretation could be presented. Thus, Section 1252(g) does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction over the claims.

In sum, the Court retains jurisdiction over this case. And even though Defendants concede that if this Court retains jurisdiction, Abrego Garcia prevails on the merits of his preliminary injunction,¹⁸ for the benefit of all, the Court briefly addresses why this concession makes sense.

III. Merits of Preliminary Injunctive Relief

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only upon “a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)). Generally, injunctions are sought to “preserve the status quo so that a court can render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits.” Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. State of S.C., 945 F.2d 781, 788 (4th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted); see also United States ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 489, 498 (4th Cir. 1999). By contrast, injunctions which alter the status quo, known as “mandatory injunctions,” are highly disfavored, Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980), and should be granted only when “necessary both to protect against irreparable harm in a deteriorating circumstance created by the defendant and to preserve the court's ability to enter ultimate relief on the merits of the same kind,” In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir. 2003), abrogation on other grounds recognized in Bethesda Softworks, LLC v. Interplay Entm't Corp., 452 F. App'x 351, 353–54 (4th Cir. 2011); see also Pierce v. N. Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 97 F.4th 194, 209 (4th Cir. 2024). Abrego Garcia requests relief designed to retore the status quo ante, or the “last uncontested status between the parties which preceded the controversy.” League of Women Voters of N. Carolina v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2014). That is, to return him to where he was on March 12, 2025, before he was apprehended by ICE and spirited away to CECOT.

To receive the benefit of injunctive relief, Abrego Garcia must demonstrate by preponderant evidence four well-established factors: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of suffering irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in its favor; and (4) that issuing the injunction is in the public interest. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The Court considers each factor separately.

A. Likelihood of Success of the Merits

As to likelihood of success on the merits, Abrego Garcia need only demonstrate a likelihood of success on one cause of action. See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Azar, 392 F. Supp. 3d 602, 613 (D. Md. 2019). Defendants concede success as to Count I, their violation of the INA. The Court agrees.

An alien “may seek statutory withholding under [8 U.S.C.] § 1231(b)(3)(A), which provides that ‘the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’ ” Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 530 (2021)). “If an alien is granted withholding-only relief, DHS may not remove the alien to the country designated in the removal order unless the order of withholding is terminated. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.22, 1208.22. The withholding of removal is country-specific and more stringent than other forms of relief from deportation because once the noncitizen “establishes eligibility for withholding of removal, the grant is mandatory.” Amaya v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 424, 427 (4th Cir. 2021), as amended (Apr. 12, 2021) (quoting Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353–54 (4th Cir. 2006)).

Accordingly, pursuant to Section 1231(b)(3)(A), once an alien is granted withholding of removal, the Defendants “may not” remove the alien to the identified country. It is undisputed that “Abrego Garcia, was removed to El Salvador despite a grant of withholding of removal to that country.” ECF No. 11. Even more disturbing, the Defendants concede that it cannot even produce the documents which reflect any authority, lawful or otherwise, to transfer him to El Salvador. Thus, the record plainly reflects that Defendants’ forced migration to El Salvador violates Section 1231(b)(3)(A). He is guaranteed success on the merits of Count I.

Next as to Count II, the procedural due process claim, Abrego Garcia alleges that Defendants forced removal to El Salvador without any process constitutes a clear constitutional violation. This the Defendants also concede. But for completeness, the Court briefly addresses why the parties are correct. To succeed on a Fifth Amendment due process claim, the plaintiff must show that he possesses “a constitutionally cognizable life, liberty, or property interest”; that he was deprived of that interest because of “some form of state action”; and “that the procedures employed were constitutionally inadequate.” Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir. 2013).

Abrego Garcia has demonstrated that he had a liberty interest by virtue of the INA in avoiding forcible removal to El Salvador. “In order for a statute to create a vested liberty or property interest giving rise to procedural due process protection, it must confer more than a mere expectation (even one supported by consistent government practice) of a benefit.” Mallette v. Arlington County Employees’ Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 635 (4th Cir. 1996). There must be entitlement to the benefit as directed by statute, and the statute must “ ‘act to limit meaningfully the discretion of the decision-makers.’ ” Id. (quoting Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 382 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).” Here, the statutory scheme which conferred withholding of removal also entitled Abrego Garcia to not be returned to El Salvador absent process. Further, the statutes at issue eliminated the discretion altogether. Thus, this element is easily met.

As to the third element, Defendants deprived Abrego Garcia of this right without any procedural protections due to him. Indeed, nothing in the record suggests that Abrego Garcia received any process at all. Accordingly, he is likely to succeed on the merits of Count II.

Last, and for similar reasons, Abrego Garcia is likely to succeed on the merits of the APA claim, Count III. The APA mandates that “agency action must be set aside if the action was ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’ or if the action failed to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements.” Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414(1971), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); W. Virginia v. Thompson, 475 F.3d 204, 209 (4th Cir. 2007). An agency action is arbitrary and capricious when the agency disregards rules or regulations still in effect or departs from a prior policy without “articulat[ing] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” See Sierra Club v. Dep't of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260, 293 (4th Cir. 2018). In short, an agency may not “depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).

The Defendants do not dispute that its expulsion of Abrego Garcia to El Salvador constitutes a final agency action. Nor do they dispute that the decision was without any lawful authority whatsoever. Nor have Defendants articulated any rationale for taking such action. Their action was lawless, and thus in violation of the APA.

Abrego Garcia, as all who have touched this case recognize, is likely to succeed on the merits of these claims. The first Winter factor is thus satisfied.

B. Irreparable Harm

Regarding the second Winter factor, Abrego Garcia must show that he will be irreparably harmed in the absence of preliminary injunctive relief. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. This standard requires more than the mere “possibility” of irreparable harm; rather, the plaintiff must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Id. at 21.

Obviously, “the risk of torture, beatings, and even death clearly and unequivocally supports a finding of irreparable harm.” J.G.G., 2025 WL 890401, at *16, citing United States v. Iowa, 126 F.4th 1334, 1352 (8th Cir. 2025) (torture); Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (physical abuse). Perhaps this is why Defendants anemically suggested that Abrego Garcia failed to show he would be “harmed” in CECOT, but then abandoned that contention at the preliminary injunction hearing. Certainly as to Abrego Garcia, the IJ found that returning him to El Salvador at all would likely subject him to persecution at the hands of Barrio 18, to include the risk of death. ECF No. 1-1 at 7.

More fundamentally, Defendants do not dispute that their placement of Abrego Garcia at CECOT invites this very harm. Defendants effectuated his detention in one of the most notoriously inhumane and dangerous prisons in the world. Defendants even embrace that reality as part of its well-orchestrated mission to use CECOT as a form of punishment and deterrence. ECF No. 10-5 at 4 (Defendant Noem announcing while standing in front of caged prisoners at CECOT “if an immigrant commits a crime, this is one of the consequences you could face ․ You will be removed and you will be prosecuted.”).

But particular to Abrego Garcia, the risk of harm shocks the conscience. Defendants have forcibly put him in a facility that intentionally mixes rival gang members without any regard for protecting the detainees from “harm at the hands of the gangs.” ECF No. 10-3 at 15. Even worse, Defendants have claimed—without any evidence—that Abrego Garcia is a member of MS-13 and then housed him among the chief rival gang, Barrio 18. Not to mention that Barrio 18 is the very gang whose years’ long persecution of Abrego Garcia resulted in his withholding from removal to El Salvador. To be sure, Abrego Garcia will suffer irreparably were he not accorded his requested relief. He has satisfied the second Winter factor.

C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest

The Court considers the last two factors in tandem because “the balance of the equities and the public interest ․ ‘merge when the Government is the opposing party.’ ” Antietam Battlefield KOA v. Hogan, 461 F. Supp. 3d 214, 242 (D. Md. 2020) (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). As to the balance of the equities, “courts ‘must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.’ ” Winter, 555 U.S., at 24 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)). When considering the public interest, the Court “should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)). The Court is mindful that it may not collapse this inquiry with the first Winter factor. See USA Farm Lab., Inc. v. Micone, No. 23-2108, 2025 WL 586339, at *4 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 2025) (explaining that it is “circular reasoning” to argue that a government “program is against the public interest because it is unlawful” and that such argument “is nothing more than a restatement of their likelihood of success”).

“Of course there is a public interest in preventing aliens from being wrongfully removed, particularly to countries where they are likely to face substantial harm.” Nken, 416 U.S. at 436. Equally important, the public remains acutely interested in “seeing its governmental institutions follow the law․” Roe v. Dep't of Def., 947 F.3d at 230–31 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The absence of injunctive relief places this interest in greatest jeopardy, as demonstrated by Abrego Garcia's experience over the past three weeks.

Defendants seized Abrego Garcia without any lawful authority; held him in three separate domestic detention centers without legal basis; failed to present him to any immigration judge or officer; and forcibly transported him to El Salvador in direct contravention of the INA. Once there, U.S. officials secured his detention in a facility that, by design, deprives its detainees of adequate food, water, and shelter, fosters routine violence; and places him with his persecutors, Barrio 18. In short, the public interest and companion equities favor the requested injunctive relief.¹⁹

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court retains jurisdiction to hear this case. Abrego Garcia has also demonstrated that he is entitled to the injunctive relief sought. The Court's April 4, 2025 Order thus remains in full force and effect.²⁰

FOOTNOTES

1.   Louis Casiano, U.S. Paid El Salvador to Take Venezuelan Tren de Aragua Members for ‘Pennies on the Dollar,’ White House Says, FOX NEWS (Mar. 26, 2025), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/us-paid-el-salvador-take-venezuelan-tren-de-aragua-members-pennies-dollar-white-house-says.

2.   Defendants did not assert—at any point prior to or during the April 4, 2025, hearing—that Abrego Garcia was an “enemy combatant,” an “alien enemy” under the Alien Enemies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 21, or removable based on MS-13's recent designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under 8 U.S.C. § 1189. Invoking such theories for the first time on appeal cannot cure the failure to present them before this Court. In any event, Defendants have offered no evidence linking Abrego Garcia to MS-13 or to any terrorist activity. And vague allegations of gang association alone do not supersede the express protections afforded under the INA, including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(b)(3)(A), 1229a, and 1229b.

3.   ECF No. 11-3 at 3 (“Through administrative error, Abrego-Garcia was removed from the United States to El Salvador. This was an oversight ․”); Hr'g Tr., Apr. 4, 2025, 19:11–13 (Mr. Reuveni: “This person should -- the plaintiff, Abrego Garcia, should not have been removed. That is not in dispute.”).

4.   ECF No. 1-4; ECF No. 10-2; ECF No. 10-3.

5.   The “evidence” against Abrego Garcia consisted of nothing more than his Chicago Bulls hat and hoodie, and a vague, uncorroborated allegation from a confidential informant claiming he belonged to MS-13's “Western” clique in New York—a place he has never lived. ECF No. 31.

6.   A decision by an IJ becomes final “upon waiver of appeal or upon expiration of the time to appeal if no appeal is taken within that time.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39. The deadline for filing an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals is 30 days from the date of the decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(b). Once final, a grant of withholding of removal prohibits removal to the country of feared persecution absent formal reopening and termination of that protection. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.24.

7.   Female detainees were returned to the United States because the prison would not accept them. See, e.g., J.G.G. v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-766 (JEB), ECF No. 55-1.

8.   It is unclear what qualifies as a “convicted criminal” under the terms of the agreement, but Abrego Garcia has not been convicted of any crime.

9.   Vasquez Sura and A.A.V.’s claims are not the subject of this decision, and so for clarity, the Court refers solely to Plaintiff Abrego Garcia.

10.   In this context, habeas claims need not be brought to the exclusion of all other claims. See R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 185–186 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that “APA and habeas claims may coexist” where aliens challenge their detention in violation of removal procedures).

11.   See Matthew Lee & Regina Garcia Cano, Trump Officials Secretly Deported Venezuelans and Salvadorans to a Notorious Prison in El Salvador, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 15, 2025), https://apnews.com/article/trump-deportations-salvador-tren-aragua-64e72142a171ea57c869c3b35eeecce7.

12.   Louis Casiano, U.S. Paid El Salvador to Take Venezuelan Tren de Aragua Members for ‘Pennies on the Dollar,’ White House Says, FOX NEWS (Mar. 26, 2025), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/us-paid-el-salvador-take-venezuelan-tren-de-aragua-members-pennies-dollar-white-house-says.

13.   Defendants also urged this Court to follow Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009), wherein the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a claim could not sound in habeas where the plaintiff sought relief to avoid “torture” in the receiving country. The Kiyemba Court held that because a “district court may not question the Government's determination that that a potential recipient country is not likely to torture a detainee,” the habeas claims fail on the merits. Id., citing Munaff, 553 U.S. at 514. That is not this. Defendants have already determined that Abrego Garcia must not be returned to El Salvador because he had established under the INA that he faces persecution from Barrio18. ECF No. 1-1. Defendants remain bound to that decision just as much today as they were when they decided not to appeal that determination. Defendants’ violation of the INA in detaining Abrego Garcia in El Salvador does not implicate United States’ policy decisions as to El Salvador's possible propensity to violate the Convention Against Torture writ large. ECF No. 11 at 16 (this Court should defer to the Defendants’ determination that Abrego Garcia will not likely be tortured or killed in El Salvador, this implicating Executive policy decisions). Accordingly, Kiyemba does not counsel a different outcome.

14.   See, e.g., 25-cv-766-JEB, ECF No. 55-1 (Declaration of S.Z.F.R., a female detainee formerly held at Webb County Detention Center in Laredo, Texas awaiting a merits hearing on her asylum claims was part of the mass transport to CECOT but ultimately returned to the United States because CECOT would not accept females); ECF 67-10 (Declaration of immigration attorney for Jose Hernandez Romero, who had been detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center pending his asylum hearing at time was transported to CECOT); ECF No. 67-11 (Declaration of immigration attorney for detainee, G.T.B., a native of Venezuela who had been detained at Aurora Contract Detention Facility awaiting deportation proceedings when transported to CECOT without warning. ICE ultimately returned her to the United States); ECF No. 67-11 (Declaration of immigration attorney for detainee, Jerce Reyes Barrios, who had been housed at Otay Mesa Detention Center awaiting hearing on protected status, prior to transport to CECOT); ECF No. 67-14 (Declaration of immigration attorney for detainee, E.V., who had been housed at Moshannon Valley Processing Center in Philipsburg, Pennsylvania awaiting hearing on final order of removal when transported to CECOT); ECF No. 67-16 (Declaration of immigration attorney for detainee J.A.B.V., who had been detained domestically prior to his removal hearing scheduled for April 7, 2025 was transported to CECOT); ECF No. 67-17 (Declaration of immigration attorney for detainee, L.G., who had been detained at Moshannon Valley Processing Center in Philipsburg, Pennsylvania, awaiting removal proceedings prior to transfer to CECOT).

15.   Nayib Bukele (@nayibbukele), X (Mar. 19, 2025, 8:12 PM), https://x.com/nayibbukele/status/1886606794614587573

16.   U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., How It's Going, DHS, https://www.dhs.gov/medialibrary/assets/video/59108 (last visited Apr. 4, 2025) (quoting Defendant Noem: “This facility is one of the tools in our toolkit that we will use”).

17.   See sample warrant for removal at https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2017/I-205_SAMPLE.PDF

18.   See Hr'g Tr., Apr. 4., 2025, at 25:10–14 (Mr. Reuveni: “if you're not buying our jurisdictional arguments, like, we're done here ․ We have nothing to say on the merits.”).

19.   Defendants suggested in their response that the public retains an interest in not returning Abrego Garcia to the United States because “he is a danger to the community,” ECF No. 11, only to abandon this position at the hearing. Again, with good reason. No evidence before the Court connects Abrego Garcia to MS-13 or any other criminal organization.

20.   For these same reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Stay the Court's April 4, 2025 Order. ECF No. 29.

Paula Xinis, United States District Judge

 

 

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