This week, I originally intended to write about appellate advocacy in light of the Presidential debate. However, given what occurred, I have postponed these comments because I think the “gas-lighting” regarding the pre-debate condition of our President is a more pressing issue. Arguably, however, the opinion in Trump v. United States (July 1, 2024) No. 23-939, is an even more important issue, so I will first address at least one aspect of this ruling first, including and especially the concurring opinion by the oldest and longest-serving member of the present court, Justice Clarence Thomas.
As a life-long civil libertarion I was stunned, quite frankly, when Attorney General Garland created the “office” of the “special counsel” in order to appoint Jack Smith to engage in what many call “lawfare” against President Trump. This is because only Congress may create a Federal office. I was not the only one to take notice, for Justice Thomas’ concurrence to the majority opinion sets forth the manner in which “private citizen” Jack Smith was appointed.
In this case, the Attorney General purported to appoint a private citizen as Special Counsel to prosecute a former President on behalf of the United States. But, I am not sure that any office for the Special Counsel has been “established by Law,” as the Constitution requires. Art. II, §2, cl. 2. By requiring that Congress create federal offices “by Law,” the Constitution imposes an important check against the President—he cannot create offices at his pleasure. If there is no law establishing the office that the Special Counsel occupies, then he cannot proceed with this prosecution. A private citizen cannot criminally prosecute anyone, let alone a former President.
No former President has faced criminal prosecution for his acts while in office in the more than 200 years since the founding of our country. And, that is so despite numerous past Presidents taking actions that many would argue constitute crimes. If this unprecedented prosecution is to pro ceed, it must be conducted by someone duly authorized to do so by the American people. The lower courts should thus answer these essential questions concerning the Special Counsel’s appointment before proceeding. (Trump v. United States, pp. 1-2)
Therefore, as Justice Thomas explains at page two, such a prosecution may only be done by someone duly authorized to do so by "the American people.” He therefore quotes from Article II, Section II, Clause II, of the United States Constitution:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Department. (Emphasis added.)
Justice Thomas cites to the Federalist Papers, which discuss, with great logic and eloquence, the requirement a President may only appoint someone to an office created by Congress, and not by Executive Branch fiat, grew out of the virtually unlimited power of the British Monarch to create titles and offices. The drafters of the Constitution therefore sought to give the President inferior powers, as evidenced by one of the specific grievances listed in paragraph 12 of the Declaration of Independence:
Before the President or a Department Head can appoint any officer, however, the Constitution requires that the underlying office be “established by Law.”1 The Constitution itself creates some offices, most obviously that of the President and Vice President. See §1. Although the Constitution contemplates that there will be “other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise pro-vided for,” it clearly requires that those offices “shall be established by Law.” §2, cl. 2. And, “established by law” reers to an office that Congress creates “by statute.” Lucia v. SEC, 585 U. S. 237, 254 (2018) (THOMAS, J., concurring); see also United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1213 (No. 15,747) (CC Va. 1823) (Marshall, C. J.).
The limitation on the President’s power to create offices grew out of the Founders’ experience with the English monarchy. The King could wield significant power by both creating and filling offices as he saw fit. He was “emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. He not only ap- point[ed] to all offices, but [could] create offices.” The Federalist No. 69, p. 421 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 271 (T. Cooley ed. 1871) (“[A]s the king may create new titles, so may he create new offices”). That ability to create offices raised many “concerns about the King’s ability to amass too much power”; the King could both create a multitude of of-fices and then fill them with his supporters. J. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”? 70 Stan. L. Rev. 443, 492 (2018) (Mascott); see also G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787, p. 143 (1969) (describing “the power of appointment to offices” as “the most insid-ous and powerful weapon of eighteenth-century despotism”); T. Paine, Common Sense (1776), reprinted in The Great Works of Thomas Paine 11 (1877) (explaining that “the crown . . . derives its whole consequence merely from being the giver of places and pensions”). In fact, one of the grievances raised by the American colonists in declaring their independence was that the King “ha[d] erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people and eat out their substance.” Declaration of Independence ¶12. The Founders thus drafted the Constitution with “evidently a great inferiority in the power of the President, in this particular, to that of the British king.” The Federalist No. 69, at 421. (Id., pp. 3-4; emphasis added.)
Justice Thomas aptly notes the obvious, namely that when Mr. Smith was appointed to the “office” created by Mr. Garland, there was no citation to any statute and the Justice Department has not cited to any statute that actually creates such an office. The concurring opinion therefore quotes James Madison, who warned us:
“If there is any point in which the separation of the Legislative and Executive powers ought to be maintained with greater caution, it is that which relates to officers and offices.” 1 Annals of Cong. 581. (Trump v. United States, p. 6.)
The man appointed by executive branch fiat
Finally, as to the very man appointed to the office of “special counsel” in an apparently “extra-Constitutional” manner, a more principled man might have refused this appointment. Indeed, based on the insidious motivation underlying the supposed establishment of a special counsel’s “office” by Mr. Garland, it would have been quite easy for Mr. Smith to have refused this appointment on the grounds it is improperly-created under the provisions of Article II, Section II.
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