Ride sharing service has no duty to perform background checks on all potential riders (Shikha v. Lyft)

California's Second District, Division Three, has ruled the general duty of due care one owes to another does not extend to include a duty owed by ride-share platforms to its drivers to perform "background checks" on all passengers. (Shikha v. Lyft (May 17, 2024, B321882.)

Writing for the court, Justice Adams summarized the factual and procedural background succinctly:

In February 2020, Al Shikha was working as a Lyft driver when he accepted a ride request through the Lyft app from passenger Ricky A. Alvarez.  During the ride, and without any warning or provocation, Alvarez repeatedly stabbed Al Shikha, causing lacerations to Al Shikha’s left hand and both legs.  In  April 2020, Al Shikha filed a complaint asserting three causes of action against Lyft: (1) failure to provide workers’ compensation insurance; (2) negligence; and (3) failure to provide a safe place of employment. (Id., pp. 2-3.)

The Second District explained there was no justification for imposing such a duty despite the general rule that all persons owe a duty of due care to others to act reasonably. (See, e.g., Civil Code section 1714.1.)   As the Second District opinion teaches, the statutory duty to verify the criminal record of a driver does not extend to doing so for passengers. As to any common-law duty, Shikha found no duty was owed to its own drivers even though Lyft was admittedly in a "special relationship" with these persons.  This conclusion required analysis of the factors enunciated by the Supreme Court in 1969's Rowland v. Christian, including the crucial factor of foreseeability:

To depart from the general principle that all persons owe a duty of care to avoid injuring others . . . ‘involves the balancing of a number of considerations’: ‘the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.’ [Citation.]” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 217, citing Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 112– 113; accord, Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 993, 1021 (Kuciemba).)  We consider the Rowland factors at “ ‘a relatively broad level of factual generality.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] . . . Before analyzing the Rowland factors, we must identify the specific duty Al Shikha asserts Lyft should undertake. (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1214 (Castaneda).)  The complaint alleges Lyft has a duty to conduct “basic, inexpensive public record background checks on passengers to determine whether they pose a risk of harm to drivers (or to obtain consent from drivers that they may be transporting a known criminal).” On appeal, Al Shikha argues Lyft is required to “either warn drivers about riders with serious criminal histories[ ] or otherwise exclude such riders from its network.” 

“ ‘The most important factor to consider in determining whether to create an exception to the general duty to exercise ordinary care . . . is whether the injury in question was foreseeable.’ [Citations.]” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 629.) In assessing the Rowland factors in cases involving a defendant’s duty to prevent third party criminal conduct, courts have employed a “sliding-scale balancing formula.” [Citation.]  (Id., pp. 8-10.)

Discussing cases involving the duty to prevent the criminal acts of third parties, such as Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 666, the Second District explained that in deciding whether to impose a duty of due care, the "burden" of preventing the plaintiff's harm must be balanced against the effectiveness of the proposed precautions.  Here, this analysis indicated no duty of due care was owed given the proposed precaution (background checks) was both burdensome and of "dubious" effectiveness:

Al Shikha contends conducting criminal background checks on all potential rideshare passengers would entail minimal costs and would not be highly burdensome. Lyft, in contrast, asserts the obligation would impose significant financial and social burdens. Lyft argues screening each passenger would require a “huge and unwieldy infrastructure”; that it would expose Lyft to liability because there is no guarantee it would successfully identify people inclined to violence; it would be impossible for passengers to download and sign up for the app at the time a ride is needed; it would burden those with criminal histories who are not inclined to violence but still need transportation; it would unfairly discriminate against broad segments of the population; it would have an “unfair or even unlawful[ly] discriminatory effect on minorities and marginalized populations”; and it would conflict with the strong public policy of maintaining consumer privacy. As the court determined in Castaneda, we similarly conclude here that conducting criminal background checks on all rideshare passengers would be “a burdensome, dubiously effective and socially questionable obligation . . . .” (Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1217.) (Id., p. 17.)

The Shikha  court noted that not only did plaintiff fail to provide any cogent argument as to why and how a background check would prevent future injuries, but logic dictated background checks cast a very wide net, as nearly one in three adult Californians have an arrest record. (Id., p. 19.)

It should also be noted Shikha discussed the recent case of Kuciemba v. Victory Woodwork, involving the supposed duty owed by a landowner to the spouse of someone working on the land to prevent the worker's exposure to COVID-19.  The  California Supreme Court unanimously held the spouse's was limited to a workers compensation remedy.

Of course, plaintiff in Shikha argued there was a "failure to warn" of the potential harm from the violent passenger.  However, in Moses v. McKeever a visitor to a condo similarly argued they were owed the duty to be "warned" about a defect in the HOA's common area because such an injury to those entering and exiting the condo was "foreseeable."  However, the appellate court found there was no duty owed by an individual owner or tenant to warn of defects in the HOA's common area.

Analysis

When looking at both practicalities and public policy, it appears the result in Shikha could not have been otherwise.  Indeed, if the duty plaintiff sought to impose were imposed on ride-sharing services, a whole host of persons who do not have access to their own vehicle could potentially be barred from using these services.  This includes not only convicted felons but also, more broadly, those who have been arrested for a wide variety of offenses even if not ultimately charged or convicted.

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Employer owes no duty to employee's spouse to prevent employee's exposure to COVID-19 (Kuciemba v. Victory)

Though an employee’s wife may sue the employer in tort, no duty is owed to the spouse to prevent COVID exposure to the employee

A unanimous California Supreme Court has ruled in favor of an employer whose alleged negligence caused the employee to become exposed to COVID-19 who in turn exposed his wife. (Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc. (July 6, 2023) S274191.)  Plaintiff and appellant Corby Kuciemba brought suit and defendant and respondent Victory Woodworks filed a demurrer arguing, inter alia, that the wife’s“exclusive remedy” against the employer was a claim under the Worker’s Compensation system.  After the United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a motion to dismiss the action under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b)(6), plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal certified the following questions of law to the California Supreme Court which it deemed necessary to decide the appeal:

(1) If an employee contracts COVID-19 at the workplace and brings the virus home to a spouse, does the California Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA; Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq.) bar the spouse’s negligence claim against the employer? (2) Does an employer owe a duty of care under California law to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to employees’ household members? (Id., p. 1.)

The California Supreme Court assumed, for purposes of its opinion, that the facts plead were indeed true.  Plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of the husband’s employer which led to his exposure to COVID at a job site and, in turn, exposure to plaintiff, his wife:

On May 6, 2020, Robert Kuciemba began working for defendant Victory Woodworks, Inc. (Victory) at a construction site in San Francisco. About two months later, without taking precautions required by the county's health order, Victory transferred a group of workers to the San Francisco site from another location where they may have been exposed to the virus. After being required to work in close contact with these new workers, Robert became infected. (Id., p. 3; footnotes omitted.)

Plaintiff also alleged she became ill with COVID and therefore required hospitalization.

The Supreme Court concluded the doctrine of Workers Compensation Exclusivity did not bar the wife’s complaint

While it did not ultimately change the outcome of the case, the Supreme Court agreed with appellant on the issue of workers’ compensation exclusivity.  Kuciemba thus held the suit by the wife was not barred by the fact her husband was the employee of the defendant, meaning the employer could be sued by the wife in a tort action.

Of course, in Kuciemba the wife’s suit was arguably “derivative” of her husband’s exposure to COVID.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found workers’ compensation was not her “exclusive remedy.”  Her claim was not “derivative” of his injury because, unlike a claim for loss of consortium, the claim of the wife depended on the husband’s exposure to COVID but not actual work-place injury to the husband: 

Accordingly, Victory's sole focus on viral transmission as a factual “but for” cause is misplaced. For the derivative injury rule to apply, Robert's infection must not only be the factual cause of Corby's illness; Corby's claim must also be “legally dependent on injuries suffered by” Robert. Robert's infection may have been a necessary factual step in the causal chain that led to Corby's illness. But it is not necessary for Corby to allege or prove injury to Robert to support her own negligence claim. The difference becomes clear when her claim is compared to a derivative claim like loss of consortium. If Corby had sought recovery for loss of consortium, she would have been required to prove that an injury to her spouse, Robert, in turn injured her by affecting their marital relationship. To support her negligence claim here against Victory, however, she need only show that Robert was exposed to the virus at the workplace and carried it home to her. (Id., p. 11; emphasis added)

This ruling was in accord with See’s Candies, Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 73 Cal. App. 5th 66 (review denied April, 13, 2022, S272923).  It should be noted the Court of Appeal opinion in Sees was decided after the Ninth Circuit had already certified its question to the California Supreme Court.

However, dismissal of the suit was proper as no duty of due care was owed to the plaintiff by her husband’s employer

The wife being able to sue her husband’s employer in tort, the case then turned upon the second issue related to duty.  The Supreme Court explained that the scope of duty in California is statutorily-defined by Civil Code section 1714(a), stating broadly that “everyone” owes a duty of care “to another:” 

Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.

In Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 108, the Supreme Court held that not all persons owe a duty of due care to all other persons in all circumstances.  As the Supreme Court later clarified, Rowland provides there are several considerations that, when balanced by the court, may justify an exception to the general duty of reasonable care embodied in section 1714. (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal. 4th 764.)  These “Rowland factors” include, as Cabral explained, all of the following: 

. . . [T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. (Id., p. 771.)

Cabral further explained that despite the landmark holding in Rowland, courts only balance these factors and consider whether or not a duty of due care is owed where there are clear “public policy reasons” for doing so because “in the absence of a statutory provision establishing an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714, courts should create one only where ‘clearly supported by public policy.’ [Citations.]” (Id., quoting Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 112.) 

Kuciemba grouped these Rowland factors into two categories, to wit, those that involved the foreseeability of harm and those involving public policy.  “Foreseeability” factors are forward-looking and the “public policy” factors are backward-looking. (Id., p. 30.)  The Supreme Court found the Rowland factors involving foreseeability indicated a duty of due care was owed to the plaintiff, but that this was not dispositive.  Rather, the factors related to public policy must also be considered, and these factors did not indicate a duty of due care was owed.  For example, consideration of “prevention of future harm” indicated no duty was owed: 

The next Rowland factor, the “policy of preventing future harm is ordinarily served, in tort law, by imposing the costs of negligent conduct upon those responsible.”  . . . This factor thus examines both the positive and the negative societal consequences of recognizing a tort duty. Public policy strongly favors compliance with health orders to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Recognizing a duty of care beyond the workplace could enhance employer vigilance in this regard. However, there is only so much an employer can do. Employers cannot fully control the risk of infection because many precautions, such as mask wearing and social distancing, depend upon the compliance of individual employees. Employers have little to no control over the safety precautions taken by employees or their household members outside the workplace. Nor can they control whether a given employee will be aware of, or report, disease exposure. There is also a possibility that imposing a tort duty not covered by workers’ compensation could lead some employers to close down. . . . (Id., p. 38; citations omitted.) 

In summary, the economic and other consequences of imposing a duty upon employers to prevent COVID transmission from their employees to third parties indicated no such duty was owed.  As Justice Corrigan stated succinctly, such a duty could not be imposed because of the broad swatch of potential liability which would result:

. . . [A] duty to prevent secondary COVID-19 infections would extend to all workplaces, making every employer in California a potential defendant. (Id., p. 38; original emphasis.)

Why the discussion of public policy in Kuciemba is important

The Supreme Court opinion in Cabral has been interpreted by many courts something like this: as a general rule, everyone owes everyone else a duty of due care unless there is a crystal-clear public policy reason for not imposing a duty.  In particular, this approach has been used by many trial courts as an excuse to not consider public policy vis a vis the facts of the case even though such is required to rule upon a demurrer and or motion for summary judgment.

Trial courts therefore refuse to dismiss claims by way of demurrer or motion under the rubric the defendant broadly owes the plaintiff a duty of due care, no matter the tenuous nature of fatal causation.  Causation being a question of fact for the jury, the trial court does not conduct any detailed analysis of the facts of the case in terms of whether public policy indicates there should be liability, instead simply finding the case must proceed to a jury trial. 

As discussed in our prior post, one such example is Razoumovitch v. Hudson Ave. LLC (May 1, 2023) B316606.  The Second District, Division Seven held a tenant who accesses a roof area after being locked out of their apartment is owed a “duty of care” by their landlord to prevent injury from re-entering their apartment by attempting to “swing” up to roof ledge not designed to be accessed by tenants.  Razoumovitch concluded the general duty of due care applied because the defense had not shown there were clear public policy considerations that indicated otherwise.  Razoumovitch discussed the oft-cited proposition that someone is not owned a duty of due in regards to warning of an obvious defect.  But it also noted that this rule had a crucial exemption and does not apply where the injury is “foreseeable” because plaintiff has a “necessity” to encounter the harm, citing to Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal. 4th 659, at 673.

While it would be speculative to say whether or not Razoumovitch would have been decided differently had Kuciemba been decided first, there is considerable language in the latter opinion which may be cited to rebut the contention that every defendant owes a duty of due care to every plaintiff with no exception.  Specifically, the Supreme Court in Kuciemba made it plain the burden to society caused by imposing a duty of due care, and, in particular, imposing a duty under novel circumstances, is an important factor for courts to consider.

Defendants may therefore wish to cite to Kuciemba’s discussion as to the scope of the potential liability imposed, as the Supreme Court aptly noted that virtually every employer in the state would become a potential defendant if a duty were owed by employers to family members to prevent employee exposure to COVID.  

The court continued this analysis by noting the impracticability of imposing liability upon employers given they “cannot fully control the risk of infection because many precautions, such as mask wearing and social distancing, depend upon the compliance of individual employees.” (Id., p. 38.)  Moreover, even though imposing such liability night encourage employers to enact more stringent safety measure, it is also true that measures taken by employers to lessen their liability might impede the delivery of essential services. (Id., p. 43.)  

Courts deciding issues of duty in other contexts should be asked to undertake a detailed public policy analysis -- as part of their ruling upon a demurrer or motion for summary judgment -- with similar rigor rather than simply finding the defendant owes anyone and everywhere a duty of due care under Civil Code section 1714(a).  Where a trial court refuses to do so and the economics of the case warrant such, a writ petition, such as a Petition for Peremptory Writ made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(m)(1), may be filed arguing the trial court did not properly consider the issue of duty as it did not undertake the analysis required by Rowland, Cabral, and Kuciemba.