Short take-away -- "friends with benefits" may not may not qualify as a "dating relationship" under California law

A "friends with benefits" relationship may or may not qualify as a "dating relationship" under California law for purposes of application of domestic violence law. (M.A. v. B. F. (February 5, 2024) G061598.)  The Fourth District Division Three summarized the issue and its holding as follows:

We are asked here to determine whether a relationship characterized in modern parlance — and by the plaintiff in this case — as “friends with benefits” constitutes a dating relationship under Family Code section 6210, so as to support a tort claim for domestic violence. Whether such a dating relationship exists is inherently a fact-intensive inquiry, not susceptible to resolution based on shorthand labels or descriptors. We therefore do not hold a “friends with benefits” relationship is necessarily a dating relationship or that it can never be one. We simply conclude, on the specific record before us, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the relationship between plaintiff M.A. and defendant B.F. was not a dating relationship within the meaning of the relevant statutes. We affirm. (Id., pp. 1-2.)

This issue arises because California's Civil Code section 1708.6(a) provides the tort of "domestic violence" requires a "relationship."  Further, Penal Code section 13700 defines domestic violence to include "dating or engagement relationship" and Family Code section 6210 has a similar definition.

The majority in M.A. affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of B.A. under a "substantial evidence" standard of review, showing deference to its review of the evidence.  It therefore found the trial court had the discretion to find, or, in the case here, to not find, a "friends with benefits" situation involved a "relationship," noting "different inferences" could be drawn from the facts. (Id., p. 13.)  The majority also noted section 6210 uses the phrase "frequent, intimate associations” but does not define such.

Justice Sanchez dissented from the majority opinion written by Justice Gooding.  The dissent concluded that under the facts here plaintiff M.A. fell under "the category of victims the law was meant to protect" no matter the on-and-off nature of the encounters between her and defendant. (Id., p. 6.)

What the opinion does not explain

It is unclear from the record here why the plaintiff did not also bring a tort claim for assault and battery or other related torts, which claims do not require she prove the parties were in a "relationship."  It is, for example, unclear from the opinion whether such a claim would be time-barred.  Footnote seven only states that:

We note M.A. had remedies available to her under the law to seek redress for her injuries, including tort claims against B.F. for assault and battery. 

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Short take-away: Release by bicycle rider absolved city of liability for injury from pothole

 

The First District has held that under California law a municipality may be absolved of liability by a release signed by a participant in a bicycle ride. (Ty v. White (Feb. 13,2024) A164483.)  The allegation, of course, was that the city failed to maintain the roadway:

Plaintiff Ty Whitehead sued defendant City of Oakland for injuries he suffered after his bicycle hit a pothole during a training ride for the AIDS LifeCycle fundraiser. Prior to the training ride, plaintiff signed an agreement releasing the “owners/lessors of the course or facilities used in the Event” from future liability. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding the release was enforceable. Plaintiff appeals, arguing the release was invalid because it concerned a matter of public interest. (Id., p. 1.)

The appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment despite plaintiff's claim the release violated California's Civil Code section 1668,  barring the effect of a release where the transaction implicates the "public interest."  The Ty court rejected this argument, noting that this was not analogous to a release imposed by a charitable hospital, but, rather, involved an activity that was purely voluntary:

In this case, the overall transaction was plaintiff’s signing of a release of liability so that he could participate in the AIDS LifeCycle fundraiser and its organized training rides on defendant’s streets. We cannot, as plaintiff urges, ignore this aspect of this case. Likewise, it cannot reasonably be concluded that a cycling fundraiser is an essential service such that plaintiff was robbed of his free will in deciding whether to sign the release. (Id., p. 12.)

The plaintiff also argued the release was unenforceable because the defendant was grossly negligent and such cannot be waived by a release. The First District, however, found the release was valid because the city's alleged mistakes did not constitute gross negligence, i.e., "there is no evidence that these select mistakes substantially or unreasonably increased the inherent risk of the cycling activity at issue." (Id., p. 20.)

This opinion is of import because it not only reiterates the viability of agreements releasing municipalities from harm, but also because upholding the grant of summary judgment encourages trial courts to give motions for summary judgment and adjudication based on a release serious attention.  A contrary result from the appellate court, finding there were "triable issues" as to the effect of the release and that plaintiff was entitled to proceed to trial, would have discouraged trial courts from ruling a release is valid as a matter of law.

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